Rhomania’s General Crisis, part 5.1-Aiming at Target:
The surprise plan for the attack on Mesopotamia hinges on surprise, which sharply limits the amount of forward planning the Tourmarches can do before the operation launches. The Ottomans know very well what Roman offensives look like, and keep a sharp eye out for the warning signs. Merchant caravans and nomad riders provide many eyes that can alert the Shah of Roman preparations.
One of those potential alerts would be the likes of either Strategos Plytos or Strategos Nereas decamping to the east. Having a guard tagma posted to the frontier, without any clear provocation from the other side, would be, even by itself, like lighting a giant neon ‘I’m about to attack you’ sign. The duo would prefer one of them to be in charge, but for this reason neither of them can be. (It would be possible for one of them to go, just without their guard tagma. But such an action would be completely unprecedented, and likely viewed as an insult to the regular tagma officers placed under their command. That would not be ideal.)
There are three potential commanders for the initial expedition who can be appointed without raising suspicion because they are already posted to the east. These are the Domestikos of the East, the Strategos of Syria, and the Strategos of the Armeniakon.
The Domestikos of the East is Manuel Doukas. He has a long record of fighting against the Ottomans, going all the way back to the latter stages of the Eternal War. For his actions during the battle of Nineveh, he earned the Order of the Dragon with Sword, the highest award for valor that can be bestowed upon a Roman. During the War of the Roman Succession, he served on the staff of the Domestikos of the East Theodoros Laskaris, participating in all of the major operations and battles against Shah Ibrahim.
He is known for being a bit of an eccentric, keeping some pet beavers on his estate that reportedly delight in servings of plum pudding. He is also very popular with his subordinates and soldiers under his command, but is also quite prickly and easily offended if he feels his prerogatives are being abused or he is being disrespected.
Since the end of the war, he has enjoyed high living, with all the benefits that come from being stationed in Antioch, one of the great cities of the Empire. In 1660, that has come around to bite him. In June he undergoes an extremely painful operation to remove some gallstones and he is currently convalescing in a health spa near Antioch. He is in no condition to command a fast-moving and hard-riding expedition into Mesopotamia.
In theory, he could be replaced on health grounds, perhaps by Plytos or Nereas. Except everyone expects Doukas to make a complete recovery. The Domestikos of the East is apolitical in his attitudes, but such a move would almost certainly make him a bitter enemy of the Tourmarches. A combination of Doukas with Michael Pirokolos, Domestikos of the West, would be an extremely dangerous combination.
Thus, the Domestikos is left to his recovery ward. He is aware of the plans, and is promised that in the 1661 campaign season, when he will have recovered, he will be placed in command to guard against the expected Persian counterattack.
The Strategos of the Syrian Theme is Theodoros Sarantenos. Out of the two themes bordering Mesopotamia, Syria would be the better choice. Even after the Great Crime, it is richer than Armeniakon and thus better able to support an attack. Given its seaports and road networks, it would also be easier to reinforce. Aside from the tagma troops themselves, Syria also has many of the best quality kastron and militia troops in the Empire that could be most useful in the field, able to bolster the surprise attack since their presence in the staging area wouldn’t raise any eyebrows beforehand.
Except Theodoros Sarantenos is extremely problematic from the point of view of the Tourmarches. He has a long personal relationship with Athena going back to when they served together during the siege of Thessaloniki. While he has kept any political opinions to himself, given the importance of this assignment, the Tourmarches are loathe to give it to anyone whose political reliability is questionable.
Sarantenos has another handicap that is quite unique for a foreign war, although it has precedence in civil wars. The hesychastic lodges begun by Saint Ioannes of the Turks in the mid-1200s had quickly found widespread support in the Roman army of the time, and while they are much less significant in the modern Roman military, they were still extremely important in the Roman army of the 1600s.
Intense personal bonds could be formed in the lodges, with their communal mystic exercises, and modern studies have proven that biorhythmic signatures of participants can mirror each other. Lodge members inside the lodge address each other as brothers, regardless of rank outside. (To avoid complications, even the most martial Emperors, even if members beforehand, are not part of a lodge. Not even Andreas Niketas could break this tradition.) In the words of Saint Ioannes, loyalty first goes to God. Then to one’s mother, for at one time her heart and yours beat as one. And then to your lodge brothers, for at certain times your hearts also beat as one. To fight against and possibly kill your lodge brother is nearly comparable to killing your own mother, the most monstrous of crimes.
This has caused some issues during Roman civil wars, with lodge brothers potentially fighting lodge brothers. But in the press of large battles, one might know a lodge brother is on the opposing side, but not necessarily in the unit directly facing them. There is a degree of plausible deniability there, albeit one that rapidly disappears as lodge brothers move up the chain of commander. Commonly, if the majority of a lodge membership goes for one side, the remaining members also go for that side as well, largely to avoid this issue.
Iskandar the Younger, now Shahanshah, served in the Roman army alongside Odysseus. He was a member of a hesychastic lodge (which has led some to question his Islamic credentials, and others to question the Christian credentials of the lodges; the latter have a history as old as the lodges themselves) and Sarantenos was also a member, alongside the likes of Michael Pirokolos and others. He can’t fight against Iskandar without breaking this bond and violating an absolutely terrible taboo. Given Iskandar’s rank, there is no plausible deniability here.
It must absolutely be emphasized that the Tourmarches do not hold this connection or taboo against Sarantenos. They are all soldiers in the Roman army and are inculcated with the same military culture. There are two other Roman officers who are aligned ideologically with the war hawks and are also lodge brothers of Iskandar, but the Tourmarches do not expect them to fight the Shah, and the pair suffer absolutely no reprimands. In contrast, another lodge brother does offer to fight Iskandar, excusing it on the grounds of Iskandar’s foreignness. All of the Tourmarches are utterly appalled and disgusted at the man’s behavior, with Nereas personally ensuring he is dishonorably discharged for ‘conduct unbecoming an officer’.
Sarantenos thus is clearly out as a possible commander, but the Tourmarches are not willing to replace him at this time. Replacing either the Domestikos of the East or the Syrian Strategos now wouldn’t guarantee alarm bells start ringing in Baghdad and Hamadan, but it would get noticed. They’re not willing to take the risk; surprise is too important.
The Strategos of Armeniakon is Petros Keraunos, a very different figure from Theodoros Sarantenos. He is one of the staunchest war hawks and a strong supporter of the Tourmarches. (That said, if Nereas had shown up without his guard tagma and taken Keraunos’s command away and then led it into battle, that opinion could change.) If one of the Tourmarches can’t be in command of this expedition, he is the next best thing.
The issues come not with the Strategos but with the theme. The Armeniakon is the poorest, least populated, and underdeveloped theme in the whole empire, with rugged terrain and a highly heterogeneous population in lifestyle, religion, and ethnicity. More troops will need to be held back in the theme to maintain local order, and while there are some kastron and militia troops that can bolster the regular tagma, there are not as many as there are in more urbanized Syria.
The emphasis on the resources available in a specific theme is another consequence of the need for surprise. Military movement within a theme is a regular occurrence and thus, if noticed, will not be an occasion for alarm. If Armeniakon launches the expedition, the preparation can be masked by tourmai moving into position as if for their regular autumnal maneuvers. These maneuvers also require movement of material and supplies and so these can be stockpiled without alerting the Mesopotamians or Persians.
Movement across theme boundaries is much more unusual and would get noticed. Maneuvers involving multiple tagmata are much rarer than single-tagma exercises. If supplies and men from the Syrian or Chaldean themes started flowing into Armeniakon, Ottoman spies would detect it and raise a warning. It could just be for an exercise, or it could be a prelude to an invasion. But movement just within Armeniakon with no support from other themes would not be considered a prelude, and could only be for an exercise.
The Tourmarches go with Petros Keraunos and the Armeniakon theme for the initial attack force. Gyranos, planning the attack, outlines an expedition of twelve thousand, with seven of the ten Armeniakon tourmai, the remainder comprised of kastron, militia, and Bedouin auxiliaries the regulars will accumulate as they make their approach. Supplies are gathered in depots, with the border fortresses providing much valuable material, but the need for secrecy limits these quantities. The expedition will have to do a good bit of living off the land, despite its relatively small size even by the standards of the time.
The Tourmarches are painfully aware of the problems of using such a small force. Twelve thousand men might be able to conquer Mesopotamia in its current soft state, but garrisoning strong points and guarding supply lines will, if spread across all of Mesopotamia, literally eat up the entirety of said force, leaving nothing for the field. Gyranos is busy setting up plans to rush reinforcements to the region, but can’t implement more than the most preliminary stages, because to do more would jeopardize the element of surprise.
The attack will come in the autumn, with the goal of rolling up Mesopotamian resistance as quickly as possible. The Persians will have only a very limited window of counterattacking before they’d be trying to funnel armies through the Zagros in winter, unlikely to be a pleasant or successful experience. By the spring of 1661, when they’d be able to try again, the Romans would’ve had the winter to bring in the needed reinforcements. Moving men and material over the winter would pose its own serious challenges for the Romans, but Gyranos was part of the team (albeit as a junior officer) that oversaw the logistical efforts that underpinned the Thessaloniki campaign.
In the autumn of 1660, all seems normal along the Roman-Persian frontier zone. The merchant caravans traverse the roads with their wares of raw silks and liquors, paper and jewelry. Pastoralists start moving their flocks from summer to winter pastures. Religious pilgrims, both Christian and Muslim, make their way to and from their holy sites. And the Armeniakon tagma stages exercises near the city of Amida.