At this point Phillips should have heard from Adm .Hart CinCAF, in Manilla about the numbers and composition of the ships at Cam Rahn Bay, from PBY recons. Also from my research MacArthur's ban on recon of Formosa, was his and not direct orders from DC. Hart had no restrictions His PBYs flew coverage 800 miles to the east and west and in an arc south to Celebes from Subic Bay and Sangley Point, with an AVD and planes in Davo Bay. This includes Cham Rahn Bay and Palau, with occasional flights to Guam refuel and return. Hart's planes stood outside the 3 mile limit but from 15,000 feet they could see inshore.

Also Hart was getting raw information and translations from Station CAST, translations from Station HYPO, and full data from Washington, wen sent. MacArthur received full intercept translations and evaluations from Washington, but refused Hart's offer of his Navy Data.
 
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MWI 41120604 The Sailing Of Force Z

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Saturday 06 December:

The captains and navigating officers had all been called over to the ‘Prince’ late last night. The navigating officers met with the Captain of the Fleet, Capt L H Bell RN, He briefed them on predicted weather conditions for the next five days, what sailing formations they might take, the dangers of the Seribuat archipelago, and the proposed courses they might find themselves taking. For the captains, meeting with Admiral Phillips and his CoS, Rear Admiral Palliser, the brief was more about the business end of things: tactical formations, possible first encounters with the Japanese, when to fire, when not, air cover and reconnaissance, predicted enemy dispositions and orders of battle. Satisfied that they knew what was expected of them, and what they could expect, they returned to their ships to make ready for sea. Palliser would remain in Singapore, to organise ongoing support for the force.

At 04.30, Force Z slid out of Singapore under an almost full moon, destroyers first and then the bigger ships. They passed along the Johore straits, and were signalled through the boom defence net gates, opened by HMS Barlane, watched by the 15-inch guns at Changi to starboard. By 06.30 they were out into the Singapore straits, heading east. Picked up and tracked by the AMES 511 COL station at Bukit Chunang, Force Z picked up speed, to a steady 14 knots, sailing irregular zigzags.

Force Z comprised the flagship HMS Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser Repulse, the heavy cruisers Cornwall and Exeter, and six destroyers, Jupiter, Electra, Encounter, Express, Thanet and the Australian ship HMAS Vampire. They were all fully stocked and fuelled, and what repairs that could be done were completed. The full radar suite on PoW was now working again, as were the suites on Repulse and Exeter, although the yard hadn’t been able to complete the fit for Cornwall. Ahead of Force Z was the Light Squadron: light cruisers Emerald and Tromp, and four destroyers, Scout, Tenedos, Kortenaer, and Piet Hein

07.15, a little after dawn, saw the arrival over Singapore of the twice daily Japanese recon aircraft, a C5M2 'Babs'. With some difficulty, the snooper confirmed Force Z had left port, and then found them in the Singapore Straits heading east. But owing to heavy low cloud, rain squalls, and two Hurricanes of RNZAF 485 Squadron climbing to close in, her crew couldn't fully determine how many ships and types before they had to leave, coded radio messages screaming out.

Ahead of Force Z the channels had been swept by the minesweepers. With a couple of Vildebeest aircraft of RAF 212 Squadron, armed with depth charges, out in front looking for shipping, especially submarines, they passed the guard ship, HMS Raub. She was a coastal steamer converted into an auxiliary anti-submarine ship, equipped with a 4-inch gun, ASDIC, and some depth charges. Once clear of the Straits and into the South China Sea, Force Z began the turn, heading in a north-easterly direction.

Meanwhile back in Singapore, Special Branch Police had been watching the known Japanese agents. Overnight they had all been rounded up on minor charges, and due to "official red tape", not released until the evening of the following day. The security around the Naval base had been very tight for a number of days now, and that would continue.

The importance of Force Z sailing was underlined when, at noon, a Hudson of 1st RAAF Sqn, operating from Kota Bharu at the extreme limit of its range, reported a convoy 80 miles southeast of Cape Ca Mau sailing towards the Gulf of Siam. By 1pm the British high command was fully aware that the Japanese were moving. Their best guess was that the Japanese would assemble in Kau Rong Bay (Cambodia), placing them under close air cover by day, and ready to invade the Kra Isthmus under the cover of darkness. Further reconnaissance missions failed to sight anything owing to the heavy cloud cover and numerous rain squalls, some very heavy. Another Hudson had been badly damaged while landing at Kota Bharu.

By 22.30, Force Z had passed east of the Anambas Islands, and was roughly level with Kuantan, but about 240 nautical miles east. Phillips ordered a change of course, onto an NNW direction. He reviewed the latest intelligence report, which, in truth told him very little more. A Hudson had sighted transports 80 miles southeast of the southern tip of Indo-China. This had been confirmed by HMS Regulus, which had also sighted two large convoys heading westwards, then had to dive and endure an hour of sporadic depth charging from Japanese destroyers.

Phillips knew a heavy cruiser force had sailed from Samah, Hainan Island, two days ago, as did another force with at least one Kongo class battleship, from Mako in the Pescadores. But Naval Intelligence was still saying all the big carriers had remained in Japanese home waters. It was all very risky: he had to be mindful of the safety of his command, but Admiral Tom Phillips had been true to his word. Operation Picador was in progress.
 
Those little butterflies are having an effect now. The weather is the greatest uncertainty - a sighting or non-sighting at a critical time could swing this either way for Force Z. Though the working radar on PoW might just be the game changer Phillips needs.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Oh dear, strictly speaking and from a purely technical standpoint, the Japanese attack with depth charges against HMS Regulus is in and of itself an attack of war. And thus the British can justify claim that their assault into Thailand against the Japanese forces there is a response to the Japanese attack on their submarine. Gort has been given a fig leaf behind which he can hide, and so has Phillips, as both can signal their respective superiors that the Japanese have initiated hostilities by attacking a British warship in international waters without warning or a declaration of war. And while it’s a Saturday the Admiralty and Chiefs of Staff will be working, even if their respective commanders are away for the weekend, as is the Prime Minister. By Sunday all three should have received the message and be organising a meeting to discuss this latest occurrence and the ramifications that it brings to the table. Palliser once he is ashore and in receipt of the information regarding the incident with Regulus, will send a signal to Phillips counterpart Hart, warning him that the Japanese have initiated hostilities in the South China Sea, and Phillips is taking his fleet north to confront them. However I must disagree with our author on one point, I seriously doubt that the known Japanese agents who have been rounded up would be released the next day, rather they would be held until Monday, as their wouldn’t be a judge or magistrate to authorise their release available until the Monday. By which time given the situation, they would find themselves locked up as undesirables under the emergency powers. Park is now free to order the defending fighters if they can to shoot down any Japanese aircraft over Malaya or Singapore even if they are beyond territorial waters, without warning.

RR.
 
I agree that this is a significant escalation. Especially since American PBYs have been flying unmolested within 3 miles of the coast of Indochina.
 
I agree that this is a significant escalation. Especially since American PBYs have been flying unmolested within 3 miles of the coast of Indochina.
With the notice from the British of the attack by the Japanese on a RN ship it is even possible that Kimmel and Short will not cancel the alert they had been on. Kido Butai will not be found in advance but the first submarine report may be taken as more urgent as well as the radar sighting. Net result is ships guns manned and ready and watertight integrity set and possibly ready fighters launched. If so more Japanese planes shot down and possibly the Arizona doesn't get the golden BB bomb drop due to increased AA from the onset of the attack. They will still achieve a high level of surprise but guns manned and firing from the outset will have a lot of butterflies such as instead of a 40 percent torpedo hit rate it may drop to 30 to 35 percent. With ship ready and fewer hits Oklahoma may not turn turtle.
 

Sekhmet_D

Kicked
With the notice from the British of the attack by the Japanese on a RN ship it is even possible that Kimmel and Short will not cancel the alert they had been on. Kido Butai will not be found in advance but the first submarine report may be taken as more urgent as well as the radar sighting. Net result is ships guns manned and ready and watertight integrity set and possibly ready fighters launched. If so more Japanese planes shot down and possibly the Arizona doesn't get the golden BB bomb drop due to increased AA from the onset of the attack. They will still achieve a high level of surprise but guns manned and firing from the outset will have a lot of butterflies such as instead of a 40 percent torpedo hit rate it may drop to 30 to 35 percent. With ship ready and fewer hits Oklahoma may not turn turtle.
Perhaps more importantly - does a more alert Pearl manage to spot and counterstrike Kido Butai during or after the attack?
 

Driftless

Donor
At this point, how close to OTL course is this version of Force Z? Plus, there's more ships than OTL, correct? And in theory, weather permitting, there's at least the prospect of friendly air cover.
 
Would the Japanese really have started depth-charging an unknown sub contact before the Tora Tora Tora order went out over Pearl? Seems like an awful big risk of ruining the surprise. I mean, historically, can anyone guess if they'd have gone that far in such a situation?
 
Perhaps more importantly - does a more alert Pearl manage to spot and counterstrike Kido Butai during or after the attack?
There was no real plan for long range recon as they had decided they simply didn't have the planes necessary. As for a counter strike sadly the air power on the islands at that time was not impressive for a counterstrike. Something like 2 dozen dauntless, 1/2 a dozen vindicators, 1/2 a dozen flyable B-17's and a 1/2 dozen flyable A-20's.
 
Would the Japanese really have started depth-charging an unknown sub contact before the Tora Tora Tora order went out over Pearl? Seems like an awful big risk of ruining the surprise. I mean, historically, can anyone guess if they'd have gone that far in such a situation?
They shot down the RAF PBY the day before attack. Remember most of the rest of the Japanese forces did not know about the Kido Butai strike so not worried about ruining surprise for them and only focused on their own operations.
 

Sekhmet_D

Kicked
They shot down the RAF PBY the day before attack. Remember most of the rest of the Japanese forces did not know about the Kido Butai strike so not worried about ruining surprise for them and only focused on their own operations.
Surely they would have known at the flag officer level. I can't see Kondo and Ozawa being unaware that Pearl was going to be hit.
 
With the notice from the British of the attack by the Japanese on a RN ship it is even possible that Kimmel and Short will not cancel the alert they had been on. Kido Butai will not be found in advance but the first submarine report may be taken as more urgent as well as the radar sighting. Net result is ships guns manned and ready and watertight integrity set and possibly ready fighters launched. If so more Japanese planes shot down and possibly the Arizona doesn't get the golden BB bomb drop due to increased AA from the onset of the attack. They will still achieve a high level of surprise but guns manned and firing from the outset will have a lot of butterflies such as instead of a 40 percent torpedo hit rate it may drop to 30 to 35 percent. With ship ready and fewer hits Oklahoma may not turn turtle.
The issue for notifying Pearl would be complicated 2230 on 6 December HMS Regulus reports depth charging, 2245 Singapore Hq receives and confirms Regulus message notifies Command staff, finally by 0800 on 7 Dec FET( Far East Time) American Staff officer is notified , codes the report message 0845 send message it to Asiatic Fleet HQ by cable. 0850 received by Navy communication center Correigidor, Message decoded and Asiatic Fleet HQ notified, 1200 Admiral Hart gets the message about Regulus, makes decision to notify his command about the incident in particular PatWing 10, 1300 Hart makes the decision to notify Pac Fleet HQ (Kimmel), 1330 Message coded and delivered to Sangley Point Radio ,1400 Sangley Point sends message to Pac Fleet Radio. (12 hours until Japanese aircraft attack Davo , OTL). 2000 Hours Saturday 6 December Message received Pac Fleet radio, duty Officer or CPO logs message, sends to HQ PacFleet, 2100 hours message received at Pac Fleet HQ. Now what happens is there can be complicated. Is there an officer on duty authorized to decode a dispatch from CinC AF to CinC Pac if yes message decoded by 2200 hours and sent to duty Staff officer, who makes decision to or not to notify Adm. Kimmel, or place it in his priority inbox for Monday Morning. If no officer Present does duty officer attempt someone who can decode message. Does officer come in or inform communication center to hold message until normal duty officer arrives..
It is now 2300 hours 6 December Honolulu time what happens?? (7 hours until Antares sighting of Mini Sub and 6 hours until USS Ward attacks Midget Sub)(9 hours until Japanese aircraft attack)

Sorry for being long winded, but in 1941 it was more complicate sending a message 1/3rd of the way around the world in 1941.
 
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How long would HMS Regulus be kept down by the IJN attack and how soon afterwards would the be able to surface and transmit. Perhaps the local IJN commander considered the risk to the invasion fleet was such that delay the submarines ability io report was worth the political risk. see the above post for how the signal trail has a significant time lag.
 
Ahead of Force Z was the Light Squadron: light cruisers Emerald and Tromp, and four destroyers, Scout, Tenedos, Kortenaer, and Piet Hein
Now this is a show of cooperation between the British and Dutch navies. A squadron
composed of a Dutch and Brisitsh flotilla of light cruisers and destroyers.
A Royal Netherlands Navy flottilla as an integrated part of a Royal Navy battle group, it is almost a revival of old times, from the age of sail 😄
 
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Oh dear, strictly speaking and from a purely technical standpoint, the Japanese attack with depth charges against HMS Regulus is in and of itself an attack of war.
US destroyers had dropped depth charges against U-boats in the Atlantic. Citing a depth charge attack as a casus belli would be really stretching it; the attacked side could not prove who actually dropped the depth charges, or that the attackers knew who the target was.
 
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