Chemical weapons are topical. In WW2, the Japanese were perhaps the best prepared to fight a chemical battle. They had used chemical weapons in China fairly extensively. The Chinese were ill prepared to fight any battle, let alone a chemical one. The Japanese established a research establishment in Manuchukuo - unit 731, where they conducted numerous experiments on prisoners, both civil and military to prove the effectiveness/efficiency. Indeed IOTL prisoners captured in Malaya were sent there and their fight for compensation alerted the West to their predicament post-war. The Japanese developed ways to mass produce chemical/biological agents which post-war saved their leader from prosecution for warcrimes.

The best way to use chemical/biological weapons is to aim for massed concentration on a target. The best way to achieve that is with artillery. The British excelled with that method at the end of WW1. The Japanese used more tactical means - grenades/mortars/artillery. There were Japanese chemical weapons discovered on Iwo Jima but they didn't use them against the Americans which invaded. Australia as part of the Allied effort established chemical weapons dumps and held trials under Tropical conditions.
 
MWI 41051412 First Radar

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Wednesday 14 May;

Park had been driven there in his Humber Super Snipe, with Wing Commander Pearce as company, leaving the city, heading northeast along the Bukit Timah Road, past the turning for the MacRitchie reservoir and the as yet unfinished General Headquarters at Sime Road, then the Singapore Turf Club and race course, and under the railway bridge, all the while climbing up to the highlands. At the little village of Bukit Timah, the road turned north, meandering alongside the railway line. Just outside the village, they turned off and the road quickly became a narrow, gravelled lane, with passing bays for oncoming traffic. The Humber crept along up the hill in a low gear, dappled sunlight filtering through the jungle canopy lighting her way.

They’d come to see first-hand, a demonstration of the first working AMES, 250 TRU, here on Bukit Timah hill, the highest point on Singapore Island. She was a transportable unit, so had only took several days to set up, but had been waiting on extensive building works. A trail up the hill had been extended and improved into the gravel road to allow good access to the site, numerous buildings had been constructed for equipment and accommodation, and two 120ft towers, built of hardwood, erected for the aerials.

The AMES Mk 9 series TRU was the overseas alternative to the Chain Home radar, able to locate an aircraft at 30,000 ft out to a range of 120 miles, range decreasing as aircraft height lessened, only 70 miles at 10,000 ft, and was blind below 3,000 ft. However, newer units named MRU’s, mounted on Crossley trucks, using metal 105-foot aerials were now being produced, offering similar performance, with some of these earmarked for Malaya. Another two units were being installed at Kota Bharu, 243, and 244 at Kedah Peak, a 3,800 ft limestone outcrop overlooking the village of Gurun, and a keystone of any defence there. This unit had originally been planned for being sited up on Penang Hill, which overlooks Georgetown, but that site would take a lot longer to develop, so Kedah Peak would do for now.

These units weren’t the only ones to arrive, another four COL (Chain Overseas Low) stations, 511 to 514 had arrived in March, but were all static, and, like 244 TRU, needed extensive work, carving radar stations out of virgin jungle, with no local facilities present. Although their works were prioritised, they wouldn’t be ready until September. 511 and 512 were allocated to Singapore, 511, at Bukit Chunang, on the south east tip of Malaya and 512 at Tanjong Kupang, over on the south west, while 513 would serve Penang, and 514 would serve the Port of Swettenham. COL units were capable of detecting low flying aircraft, range about 80 miles for aircraft at 5000 feet, and about 15-35 miles for aircraft at 500 feet. They could also detect ships at sea, a Motor Torpedo Boat up to 15,000 yds (8.5 miles), and a Destroyer 35,000 yds (nearly 20 miles), which provided a useful aid to coastal defence. For higher flying aircraft they had a range of possibly up to 150 miles for aircraft at 20,000 feet, but will lose them quicker than TRU/MRU stations as aircraft fly closer, while maintaining height. Further fixed stations of both types were planned to be built both on the eastern and western coastlines, again needing extensive preparative site works before being installed.

So here they were, both Park and Pearce stood behind the operators, the Flight Lieutenant, CO of the station, waiting nervously nearby. The expected trial time arrived, the equipment was switched on and the system began to start up, valves warming, the transmitter began sending out electromagnetic waves, the receiver patiently waiting on a reflection. The scope came alive, a horizontal green line, an electron beam drawing a line left to right, refreshed 25 times a second, presenting a shaky tight squiggle of a line to the human eye. At the left end a large downward spike presented, the large transmitted pulse, and close by a much smaller downward spike, which the Flight Lt was quick to point out was the refection of the Cathay Building in the city. The rest of the line was clear of any further spikes, but presented as a squiggle which he explained was radar noise, or grass, as they called it in the trade.

They sat or stood waiting, a tension in the air, and then there it was, a blip, a bit bigger than the Cathay blip. Contact sir, called out the leading operator, as both operators began working, trying to calculate a bearing, height and range, the blip steady on the scope, over half way across the screen. Single aircraft, bearing 275 degrees, height 8,000 feet, range 60 miles. They watched, as gradually the blip moved, the operators recalculating, plotting the aircraft flying across them, while a third aircraftsman called on the designated telephone line back to Katong to report the contact.

Park turned to the Wing Commander, “well done Pearce, your chaps have done a fine job.” In his mind’s eye he could see the new Filter Room at Katong, RAF blue uniforms, manning a switchboard, writing down on signal pads the information to be passed to another uniform, who had nowhere yet to go. The accompanying Fighter Operations room was still incomplete, another six weeks they reckoned, But Park wanted to see this bit up and running, and was quietly more than satisfied with the results.

His smile remained on his face as he sat in the back of the Humber on the return journey, while Pearce explained how tomorrow’s exercise, a Blenheim of 27 Squadron, equipped with an AI Mk IV radar set, would try a daylight intercept of a second Blenheim, only using the radar unit installed in the aircraft to locate it.
 
MWI 41051517 Too Small For The Job

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Thursday 15 May;

The Lt Col stood still, the steady rain hitting his mackintosh raincoat, and running in rivers down his body. The light was failing fast, early but not surprising with the heavy rain clouds. His eyes could just about make out the scene below him. 50 feet down the bankside, a Bedford OY truck was on its side, the cab folded around the trunk of a large tree, the 6-inch howitzer at right angles to it, with a swath of broken, crushed jungle marking their rolling path. A gaping hole in the red and white striped wooden barrier on the roadside, and a stream of water running down off the hill, along the road, and leaving it at this bend. A number of his men were already down there, torches flashing, the accident having happened about an hour ago.

A Captain climbed up to the road, and saluted, Lt Col WG Fox looked at him, and said, with a heavy heart, “who is it Eric”

“Sargent Major Woods, Sir, dead Sir, and the driver, a gunner, Macfarlane. Didn’t stand a chance, the cab of the lorry hit a tree full on, it must have been quick for them. The other three were in the back, all thrown out. Gunners Johnson and Pike will live, just broken bones, but the other gunner, Tilson, hasn’t long to go, his chest is caved in, it’s amazing how he’s lived this long. We think as they tried to get round the bend, the howitzer slid off the road, and pulled them over.” The captain shrugged his shoulders.

“And the Howitzer?”

“Nothing the workshop can’t fix sir, it will be a devil winching her up, but it can be done. I have a team here first thing tomorrow morning, we should have her up by the end of the day. The truck is a write off, we’ll strip her down and leave her. We’ve got the two bodies up, it’s the three wounded we’re worrying about. Two of them are sedated and strapped to stretchers, we’ll begin pulling them up in about 20 minutes, but for Tilson, I think we might just stay with him until he goes, and we can’t move him, his partly under the gun. If that’s alright with you Sir?”

“Yes, yes, Sargent Woods, you say, a regular, with the regiment since before my time. A good man Eric, he’ll be missed. Dam and blast, we’re so short” Fox looked up, the captain was standing there expectantly, “Very good Eric carry on.

The captain turned and started calling out names, organising the recovery of casualties and gun. Another Bedford was coming down the road, in first gear, the engine whining in protest as it endeavoured to control the progress of the 6-inch howitzer it was towing. It crept by Fox, the formation sign of the 19th battery, 6th Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery on the truck smeared with mud.

The Colonel reflected, a bad ending to a bad series of field exercises. There had been a catalogue of problems, difficulties moving around the artillery range situated in the disused tin mining area here at Rawang, guns and tractors stuck in soft wet earth, thick jungle always trying to reclaim tracks, rocky uneven ground, making finding gun sites to deploy in, difficult, radio communications continually breaking down, and the general inexperience of the men causing mistakes and delays.

They had left India without their transport, with the promise of newly built ones awaiting them in Singapore, replacing the old well-worn trucks they’d had. But on arrival, they’d discovered that problems with production lines, changes to shipping schedules, another ship lost in the North Atlantic, meant there was no new transport for them, at least no yet, although it was promised. The Royal Army Service Corps had done its best, equipping them with a range of vehicles, some old, some new, some borrowed from other units, some requisitioned, allowing them to become mobile again, but they were left wanting. They had been given the Bedford OY’s to use as tractors, because they were the only thing available to tow his 6-inch howitzers.

And some of his officers had clearly fallen short. So different from India, but in the 10 weeks they’d been in Malaya he’d lost a number of experience men, first homeward bound for newly raised units in Britain, and then others to the new formations here, as experience was shared out. And only this Monday he’d been told he was to provide a number of experienced officers and men to assist the Australians in the raising of an Australian Medium Artillery Regiment, as trainers He sighed heavily, so much wrong, so much for him to do to get his regiment in order. And now he also had a report to write, that would be painful too.

The only good bit of news, was they had been told a ship carrying Canadian built FWD SU-COE artillery tractors, along with other new vehicles, enough for both his regiment as well as the newly forming Australian medium regiment, was leaving Vancouver early next month. They’d be rid of the Bedford’s soon; they’d been too small for the job. And as for Woods, he hadn’t let on to the captain, but Woods had been one of the few he could count on who would tell him off record what was really going on in the ranks. The Battery Sargent Major had a wife, and two kids, boys, must be early teens now. He’d write the letter himself; it was the least he could do.
 
I know it is out of topic, but does the KNIL and her air branch got their, in the USA purchased , equipment this time? In OTL a lot of equipment, from Thomson guns, to Banta Jeeps and Aircraft were witheld by USA customs, since the USA wasn't sure if the DEI was realy on their side so to speak.
 
Very good update and a good reminder that it isn't just the fighting that kills people - training and just general operations, particularly in hostile terrain, put a staedy drain on units. Some horrible - to modern eyes - percentage of aircrew deaths in WWII were training accidents and while things weren't as bad for the ground-pounders, playing around with heavy vehicles on bad roads is inherently hazardous. (Disease has also been mentioned up-thread - in the OTL New Guinea and Burma campaigns, entire units were incapacitated by malaria and dysentry).

Also an insight into how things are improving compared to OTL, even if the progress is limited and painful. OTL when the fighting started, the Commonwealth units in Malaya were overstretched and under-resourced, repeatedly drained by requirements from active theatres, short on training and unfamiliar with the environment. Better to at least identify the problems now than when the Imperial Guards come knocking.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I know it is out of topic, but does the KNIL and her air branch got their, in the USA purchased , equipment this time? In OTL a lot of equipment, from Thomson guns, to Banta Jeeps and Aircraft were witheld by USA customs, since the USA wasn't sure if the DEI was realy on their side so to speak.
At the moment all historical exchanges between the USA and The Dutch East Indies remain unchanged, only difference is the increasingly changing situation with Britain in Singapore, which at the moment is minor, but as ripples flow, so this will changer greater. I'm not aware of the US Customs holding back equipment, although there was some issues over funding initially, and others, (France and Britain) were given preference in 1940. I'd be interested in reading more about this, if you can provide some references please.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Some horrible - to modern eyes - percentage of aircrew deaths in WWII were training accidents
Well said Merrick, I need to provide a few more stories about this. Flying was inherently dangerous, I did the bit re the squadron leader looping the loop in his Blenheim, see MWI 41040707 A Stupid Loss, and it was just mentioned about the loss of the Australian Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Cyril White, along with three cabinet ministers in an air crash in August 1940, which is how Maj Gen Bennett gained command of the Australian 8th Division. Also briefly mentioned was the lose of Lt Gen Berenschot, CinC of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) killed in another air crash in November 1941. I didn't really comment on him, because he will be covered in another story. But these were the well publicised ones, many many more, training accidents due to pilot error, as well as other crashes due to aircraft failure in flight killed many, many aircrew. This I need to reiterate in stories, not necessarily being the main part of the story, but within its telling.
 
At the moment all historical exchanges between the USA and The Dutch East Indies remain unchanged, only difference is the increasingly changing situation with Britain in Singapore, which at the moment is minor, but as ripples flow, so this will changer greater. I'm not aware of the US Customs holding back equipment, although there was some issues over funding initially, and others, (France and Britain) were given preference in 1940. I'd be interested in reading more about this, if you can provide some references please.
Herman Bussemaker (who's father was Anton Bussemaker, commander of the submarine flottila and the O-16 that got sunk in December 1941) wrote the excellent Paradise in Peril. Western colonial power and Japanese expansion in South-East Asia, 1905-1941 (which is available in English and for free at https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=f1ef084a-2012-42d2-88f1-28f941b9a18e). In chapter 3 part I (The Netherlands) he describes on page 318:
Kobayashii met the G.G. on 13 September 1940, and asked van Mook to be replaced by thee Vice-President of the Council of the NEI, H J . Spit, who was considered to be the secondd in power after the Governor-General. The G.G. refused, explaining that only Van Mookk had the required knowledge about NEI economics.1520 Thee Dutch negotiators were walking on eggshells, because they had been informed that thee United States would look with disfavor on any long-term contract for delivering crude oil andd aviation gasoline to the Japanese.1521 To ensure that the Dutch got the message, a numberr of delivery contracts for weapons and planes were cancelled for good measure. Thee G.G. considered this inconsistent with American interests, but insisted the Dutch Cabinett to avoid any hint of a close political co-operation between the United States and thee NEI in the upcoming trade talks.1®
(The double letters are because I copied it from the pdf)

Page 320:
Thee U S. Government meanwhile warily followed the course of the negotiations. Dutch foreignn policy however failed in pressing the U.S. Government for an acceleration of weaponss 'ind plane deliveries in lieu of denying the Japanese the extra oil imports they weree seek ng.1534 It lacked the finesse for such a trade-off. Moreover, the Dutch wrongly concludedd from the results of the ongoing negotiations that the Japanese had as yet no aggressivee intentions.1535
Page 324:
AA real improvement in the American attitude towards Dutch rearmament was caused by thee visit of a personal friend of Roosevelt to the NEI in early September 1941. Mr. H.F. Gradyy visited the naval base at Surabaya and the KNIL Airbase at Andir, and the KNIL weaponss facilities and GHQ at Bandoeng. He reported on 12 September 1941 to the State Department1557:: "Accomplishment of much of this development [of the wharves, repair facilitiess and drydocks at Surabaya] has occurred in the past year, and the present efficiency and thethe prospects tor increased efficiency and expansion impressed me very much.Jn all bases I foundnotnot only facilities for repair and maintenance, but a considerable degree of manufactuairplaneairplane parts, munitions containers, etc. They are even producing certain precision instruments. TrainingTraining of native labor for skilled work is carried on succesfully. The Dutch will maintain in excellent conditioncondition whatever we can find to let them have of the supplies, machines and planes they need andand in case of need their facilities for serving airplanes and naval units (even targe cruisers) will be availableavailable tor the British and tor ourselves. To find in this part of the world such present and prospectiveprospective facilities ... is most encouraging. Excellent morale has been noted among all those thII have met. It has not come to my attention if any appeasement sentiment exists in the Netherlands Indies''. Indies''. Thiss report, in combination with that of the US Airforce mission under Brigade-General H.B.. Clagett from Philippine Command, ended the last American reservations about the fightingg attitude of the Dutch, f See Chapter 1. page 114
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Herman Bussemaker (who's father was Anton Bussemaker, commander of the submarine flottila and the O-16 that got sunk in December 1941) wrote the excellent Paradise in Peril. Western colonial power and Japanese expansion in South-East Asia, 1905-1941 (which is available in English and for free at https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=f1ef084a-2012-42d2-88f1-28f941b9a18e). In chapter 3 part I (The Netherlands) he describes on page 318:
Don't know the emoji for a hug and a big wet kiss on the cheeks, but your getting one HJ Tulp, this is great stuff, a lot of reading to do, thank you!
 
Well said Merrick, I need to provide a few more stories about this. Flying was inherently dangerous, I did the bit re the squadron leader looping the loop in his Blenheim, see MWI 41040707 A Stupid Loss, and it was just mentioned about the loss of the Australian Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Cyril White, along with three cabinet ministers in an air crash in August 1940, which is how Maj Gen Bennett gained command of the Australian 8th Division. Also briefly mentioned was the lose of Lt Gen Berenschot, CinC of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) killed in another air crash in November 1941. I didn't really comment on him, because he will be covered in another story. But these were the well publicised ones, many many more, training accidents due to pilot error, as well as other crashes due to aircraft failure in flight killed many, many aircrew. This I need to reiterate in stories, not necessarily being the main part of the story, but within its telling.
In retrospect it seems almost criminally reckless the appalling accident rates in training that were endured. Chiefly due of course to the need to "mass produce" pilots as quickly as it could be managed. Could the training methods and quota requirements have been slowed down to improve safety? Certainly, but the over arching goal was to win the war as quickly as possible. That was seen as the best way to reduce losses everywhere. Here are a couple of extracts from articles on WW2 training programs.

First, about the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/british-commonwealth-air-training-plan

"By the end of its life in 1945, the program had graduated 131,553 pilots, navigators, bomb aimers, wireless operators, air gunners and flight engineers from the four founding partner nations, as well as other parts of the Commonwealth and the US. Graduates also came from several Nazi-occupied European countries including France (approximately 2,000 graduates), Czechoslovakia (900), Norway (680), Poland (450), and Belgium and the Netherlands (450). Training was risky, however, and fatal accidents happened. Some 856 BCATP participants lost their lives during training."- An excerpt from the Canadian Encyclopedia article on the BCATP.

Second, an account of the U.S. aircrew losses in WW2. https://www.realclearhistory.com/ar...s_airmen_killed_in_training_in_ww_ii_412.html

"As the figures show, non-combat flying continued to be extremely hazardous whether in training in the U.S. or after arrival overseas. The courage displayed by aircrews in combat over Germany and Japan, and the losses they sustained, is one of the most memorable stories of World War II. But it should not be forgotten that nearly 15,000 young men died in training accidents without ever leaving the United States. Although they never faced flak or Messerschmitts, their sacrifice was as real and memorable as those shot down over Germany."- An excerpt from a RealClear History article on American aircrew losses including training.

Would such accident rates be tolerated today? I suppose it would depend on how desperate things were. But we would run out of aircraft rather quickly though. Nobody is going to build 300,000 combat aircraft in 5 years again. Unless they're drones.
 
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Second, an account of the U.S. aircrew losses in WW2. https://www.realclearhistory.com/ar...s_airmen_killed_in_training_in_ww_ii_412.html

"As the figures show, non-combat flying continued to be extremely hazardous whether in training in the U.S. or after arrival overseas. The courage displayed by aircrews in combat over Germany and Japan, and the losses they sustained, is one of the most memorable stories of World War II. But it should not be forgotten that nearly 15,000 young men died in training accidents without ever leaving the United States. Although they never faced flak or Messerschmitts, their sacrifice was as real and memorable as those shot down over Germany."- An excerpt from a RealClear History article on American aircrew losses including training.
Sheesh. I knew the numbers were bad, but I didn't realise they were that bad. The back of my envelope suggests that around 20% of US aircrew fatalities in WW2 were training accidents (another 12% were other non-combat accidents), at a rate of roughly 10 a day for the entire war. That is a course partly a reflection of the sheer numbers of trainees going through the program - the USAAF alone produced around 200,000 pilots and 400,000 other aircrew, not counting washouts, Navy or Marines, so the overall fatality rate was probably well under 2% and no doubt was considered acceptable given the military situation and the need for aircrew training to keep up with aircraft production.
But still. "One a day in Tampa Bay", indeed.
 
In retrospect it seems almost criminally reckless the appalling accident rates in training that were endured. Chiefly due of course to the need to "mass produce" pilots as quickly as it could be managed. Could the training methods and quota requirements have been slowed down to improve safety? Certainly, but the over arching goal was to win the war as quickly as possible.
I would only add to this that the aircraft themselves were often being rushed into service and some had known reliability issues or unpleasant and vicious handling characteristics, the worst had both.

The end of this paper has a table of the accident rates in transition flight training for USAAF bomber. The B-25 had 33 accidents per 100,000 flying hours, the B-26 was 55. Both twin-engined medium bombers, roughly the same age and presumably basically identical training system, but one had almost twice the accident rate.

This is just another part of the quota and mass production thinking, in an ideal world you would have stopped B-26 production and developed fixes, made the handling less lethal to inexperienced pilots, made it safer to land at low speed and so on. But that would delay production and aircraft were needed at the front, so designs that would never have been accepted in peace time were deemed 'safe enough'.

The darker calculus was if making an aircraft "safer" would make it slower, at which point you might have fewer training accidents but more losses in service.
 
Sounds like Operation Pike reasoning. DEI, Japan and Germany must be up to something? Then again, that was Britain and France who would have been the antagonists vs. SU
Like all things in history, it's complicated. There are a few things to consider:

1. Britain was in full Mers-El-Kebir mode. There was a window of opportunity in French Indochina where British actions might have brought the colony on their side, or at least not on the Japanese side. However, Britain was fighting for it's very survival and had plenty reason to doubt the French colonial government, let alone the Vichy government. They were also militarily unable to give anyone political guarantees without US backing.

2. The DEI government was aware of the fact that fighting the Japanese alone was not a viable option. The KNIL and KM concurred. So how to avoid a Japanese attack? Preferably by allying with the UK but when the UK refused that option clearly wasn't there. So the decision was made to avoid giving the Japanese (who had committed to the integrity of the DEI in april 1940, IF the DEI would stay neutral) a casus belli. They did this by doing their utmost best to stay neutral while buying time by holding trade talks with the Japanese. The DEI was never going to give in to the outrageous demands of the Japanese but neither the Japanese or the British nor the Americans knew that.

3. The Americans were very suspicious of the neutrality of the DEI and it's talks with Japan and apparently unable to see the security conundrum its own neutrality posed to the colonial government. Though it must be said that a small part in that was played by the Kingdom of the Netherlands lack of effective diplomacy, in part because the Dutch Minister to the United States was sick in those crucial months and in part because the Netherlands was incredibly inexperienced in these kinds of foreign affairs. Note that the Netherlands had had a policy of neutrality from over a 100 years - since 1839 - before it was forced out of that position by Adolf Hitler.
 
An elderly relative* was in the RAF and training in the US when Pearl Harbour happened and about finished his training. Anyway, the US government politely told the British they'd like to keep some of the graduating RAF class to help train the newly expanded intake so he ended up staying in the states for whiles longer, going from new graduate to trainer.

So it is not surprising that accident rates were high when decisions like that had to be made quickly.

*Well, by marriage
 
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MWI 41051618 Operation Brevity

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Friday 16 May;

Its conception had come from a decoded enigma message, sent by Lt Gen Paulus, deputy chief of the German General Staff, who was visiting Rommel, and reporting back to Berlin, that the Axis forces in North Africa were somewhat over extended, and experiencing supply problems. Back in London, Winston Churchill, dismayed at the reverses recently suffered in North Africa, along with the loss of the Greek mainland, pressed Wavell, CinC of the Middle East for a quick counter attack, taking advantage of the German supply issues, in the hope that it might lift the siege of Tobruk.

With the loss of most of Cyrenaica, the capture of the British commander, Lt Gen Phillip Neame, and the destruction of the British 2nd Armoured Division, the British rout eastwards had only been saved by the Tobruk garrison holding out, effectively stopping any further German push east. Only a light screen had held the front now, 100 miles from Tobruk, just inside the Egyptian border, with Sollum and Halfaya Pass occupied by the Germans.

Most units available to Wavell were either recovering from the disasters of Greece, in Egypt and Palestine, or garrisoning Crete. And so, only a light force could be made available, commanded by Brigadier William Gott, the Front’s commander. The plan, Operation Brevity, was for a limited advance, capturing Sollum and Halfaya Pass, as well as Fort Capuzzo, an Italian built fortification and camp on the frontier border, just west of Sollum, through which the coastal road ran through. And then, if they met with success, possibly exploit it.

Gott split his forces into three parts, the Coastal Force, an infantry battalion, supported by field and anti-tank guns, was tasked with capturing the lower part of Halfaya Pass, which climbed up through the escarpment, and then onto Sollum. The Central Force, the 22nd Guards Brigade of three infantry battalions, with the 24 Matilda tanks of the 4th RTR attached, were given the objectives of the top of Halfaya Pass, and then onto Fort Capuzzo. The third ‘Desert’ Force, 29 Cruiser tanks of the 2nd RTR, Marmon Herrington armoured cars of the 11th Hussars, along with other various small units were to screen the attack from the south.

The attack started well, earlier morning, 15th May, the ‘Desert’ Force chasing off German screening units, the 22nd Guards Bde capturing the top end of Halfaya Pass, and garrisoning it with an infantry battalion, before moving onto capturing Fort Capuzzo by noon. However, things began to unravel, Capuzzo was recaptured by the Germans by mid-afternoon, while the Coastal Force had struggled, Italian defenders putting up stiff resistance, and it wasn’t until the evening before they finally captured the bottom end of Halfaya Pass.

Gott became increasingly concerned at the vulnerability of the Guards Bde, now out on open ground, with little defensive terrain to anchor on. Worried that the Germans would mount an armoured counter attack against it, and aware that he couldn’t afford to lose any units, he pulled them back overnight, avoiding that very thing next morning, when the Germans had a concentrated armoured force in place to attack. Indeed, the 16th was spent by the British retracing their steps, German attempts to harass this retreat hampered by fuel shortages. By nightfall, ‘Brevity’ was over, leaving the British with only the gain of the Halfaya Pass to mark their success in the attack.

Ten days later, the Germans attacked, and retook Halfaya Pass, Gott withdrawing his troops to save them from destruction. Clearly, the Axis forces were stronger than first thought, and the British needed more time to build up supplies and rebuild broken units after the fall of Greece. But events here were now over shadowed as all eyes had turned on Crete.
 
One of the hardest things for the Japanese in the tropics will be the inability to stay fed, healthy and unexhausted. The keeping fit to fight is a back breaker. The aircraft you maintain may be flown by an ace. If you're wracked with malaria, beri-beri and dysentery for weeks at a time you are fighting three enemies at least.
It wasn't just the carriers. Japanese cruisers and destroyers were built to beat-the-treaty designs. To cram in extra armament while not going too obviously far above the limits, they skimped on crew accommodations. In peacetime, this could be compensated for. But in wartime, with ships on gruelling long deployments, crew condition suffered.
 
One of the hardest things for the Japanese in the tropics will be the inability to stay fed, healthy and unexhausted. The keeping fit to fight is a back breaker. The aircraft you maintain may be flown by an ace. If you're wracked with malaria, beri-beri and dysentery for weeks at a time you are fighting three enemies at least.
The Japanese may have 'jungle trained' on Formosa and Hainan prior to the Pacific War, but the truth is it did not prepare them one whit for the rainforests of South East Asia and the South Pacific, which make the Formosan and Hainanese jungles look like ornamental gardens.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Thank you Nevarinemex, more reading, and another guy getting a hug and big wet kiss.

Seriously though, understanding how the Dutch and the US interacted with the British in the Far East is most helpful in taking forward a divergent course, as historical events are changed. The what happens next is best framed around a good knowledge of what they knew and thought, as well as their strategies and capabilities.
 
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