WI Lord Halifax is appointed PM in 1940?

[MarkA]

Well, there is a big difference. France has fallen. It could be argued that this demostrates the futility of completely containing German expansionism in Europe and now Britain must focus on keeping the British Empire safe and esnruing the security of the Home Isles.



This is doable (as long as Britain is equally forbidden to introduce her forces there and France disarms, of course). Nazi Germany's expansionistic programs on Western Europe were always rather fuzzy and opportunistic and rather peripheral to the imperial progrma in Central-Eastern Europe. Of course they would keep everything if they could, but they can also give up a safely neutralized Western Europe in order to have a one-front war wit the URSS.



Withdrawing military forces from Western Europe can be agreed for, if France is disarmed. Of course, since any measure should have to be symmetrical, anything more than that would be unfeasible. I doubt the Uk would agree to demilitarize Southern England in order to demilitarize Reinland.



Well, this is not really feasible, in the sense of impractical.



Would Britain agree to demilitarise Egypt and Sudan ?




Well, pulling our German froces from Western Europe garantees the national security of the British Isles. About the broken agreements, well, the main argument would be that the Gemran conquest of Western Europe and the fall of France shows that waging a general war in Europe to deny German expansion in Central and Eastern Europe is a costly failure.

All this assumes a defeatist mentality in Britain. This was certainly not the mood among the majority of MPs and probably the population as well.

They all wanted someone to take control and carry on the fight not negotiate a surrender!

 

[General Zod]

Halifax might be considered "Dovish" in British Politics and Germany, but he would not be surrounded by more doves in a crisis government. I think that Halifax's government would not only not survive if he attempted to force a peace deal with Hitler, I think this would cause a political crisis to the point of ripping his political party apart. The people of Great Britain were furious over Hitler's betrayal of the Munich agreement, and I suspect that fury was dominant politically even during the worst days of the Blitz, and probably would have been even if Halifax would have been in power.

Not only would a UK peace deal in 1940 have been national suicide, it would also have been political suicide. There will be no arrangement based on trusting Hitler.

France is fallen, Britain is alone, and America shall never join a war in Europe unless it's attacked. That's the picture in Summer 1940. The British people has tried to stop Germany's expansion in Central-Eastern Europe, and it has failed, over and over (Norway, Benelux, France). If they are offered a decent peace deal, instead of an uphill struggle with no end or ally in sight, why shouldn't grasp it ? Sure, Hitler is wholly untrustworthy, so they will rearm, fortify their Isles and their Empire, and keep prepared.

 

[General Zod]

Why is Vichy France accepting large concessions to Italy? They're beaten, but not yet complete tools; if Hitler does hand "Il Musse" Nice and Savoy, for example, or Tunisia, that'll make them angry, even if they can't resist directly. Hitler was (being him) pretty nice to Vichy at first, because he wanted a stable puppet, not an occupied state in rebellion (and, from what we see of Vichy, it mostly worked). Why does he reconsider drastically because Britain is beaten? He thought they were already when he made the decision IOTL.

Territorial deals were essentially left out of the armistice, which was a wholly provisional measure intended to last until peace with Britain. Had Britain signed a peace deal, the treaty with France would have followed. Certain territorial losses were only natural,a nd Germany would have beyond any doubt annexed A-L, Lux, quite possibly part of or all of the rest of Lorraine. It was only natural and wise to give equal satifisfaction to old Italian claims, if nothing else because a surly snubbed Mussolini would have given Germany all kinds of headaches in the Balkans and Middle East. For German interests, fer better a loyal, quiet, and satisfied Italy and a slightly surly France, than a surly, diusloyal, and unpredictable Mussolini that could mess with German plans to no end: Greece, anyone ? There is good argument to say that had Mussolini beeen given more satisfying territorial claims into France at the Armistice, he would have never invaded Greece, and spared Germany a lot of Balkan mess.

Why is Yugoslavia more willing to support Germany here than IOTL? They're actually better off for British guarantees; remember, Britain has a negotiated peace, not an unconditioal surrender. If the British recognise the new Yugoslavian government and promise it protection, they're better off than they were IOTL, as Hitler will at least consider not wanting trouble from Britain again. And as noted, Britain will be in a "Cold War" at best with Germany; they'll guarantee the independence of anyone that's still independent.

It is exceedingly likely that any kind of peace treaty between Germany and Britain would include definition of spheres of influence to be respected, and this would include the British keeping their noses out of Eastern Europe. That was the whole German war aim.

(I suppose you could argue that the Yugoslavian coup wouldn't be sponsored by Britain with Halifax in charge, and thus might not go off, but that's no certainty, especially with Churchill still in the government.)

Would he have such influence, without being PM ? I doubt it.

Likewise, why won't Britain defend Greece's neutrality under these circumstances, assuming that Mussolini would even dare mess with them for fear of provoking a conflict with Britain (he was much more cautious than Adolph)?

Hmm, in the definition of spheres of influence, the Middle East would surely become an exclusive British zone. Hard to say whether Greece would end up in the British or Axis zone.

Hell, I could make the case that Romania and Bulgaria wouldn't join the Axis here if there are believable British guarantees made for them;at the very least, Hitler might thread a little more carefully around them a little longer.

No, really. Germany would never accept any treaty that would not recognize her exclusive influence over Romania and Bulgaria.

Finally, how much earlier do you intend the Germans to attack the USSR? The original starting date is a dream, what with the spring flood and all. The best you could hope for is probably something in early June, and a couple of weeks might not make all the difference between victory and defeat.

Well, true, but with the lack of a second war, the difference boils down to trivial.

Turkey was very neutral, so it's not all that likely that they join, and the value of their forces in a modern war is doubtful; at best, they could serve as occupation/anti-partisan troops.

Anti-partisan troops would still be rather useful.

Likewise, the Italian divisions were a mess - too small, too little artillery and support, bad armour throughout; some units like the Alpini were good, but most were mediocre or worse

So very true, WWII Italian Army was nowhere as comparatively good to the other powers as the WWI one (Benito should have been shot thrice for this ) but at least ITTL they would have lost all those men and equipment in Africa.

- and Vichy France wasn't allowed an army under the terms; in any case, the Germans used their equipment to good effect themselves.

They might be allowed to raise troops (under German survelliance) for this scope. Of course, it might be tricky for the terms of the treaty with the British.

This brings us back to the point Michele usually raises, and may already have, here (as you know, there are a couple of different threads on this topic right now): the Germans' major problem was never manpower, but equipment and materiel.

Not having a naval war, anti-air dfense needs, and another front can help. They need to focus war production on nothing but anti-Russian preparation from Summer 1940 onward.

But the troops will themselves need to be supplied, making the situation worse in the short run, even if it does improve in the long run (you're somewhat aware, I take it, of the time it takes to build roads - it isn't done in weeks, or even months in most cases). Railroad is an ever bigger bitch, and on top of that there's a German lack of trains and rolling stock.

But in the long run it will ameliorate.

The real industrial drain for Germany that the Navy was responsible for was the surface ships (esp prestige projects - heavy ships like the Tirpitz), and those wouldn't have been called off just like that.

But you can give them bottom priority, as financing and supplies go.

The surface fleet orders were pretty stable; what increased was U-boat production. You could take away some, or even most, of that, I suppose. Still, it's not a huge boon, especially as one must take into account that production lines aren't retooled that easily; a naval yard can't necessarily build tanks, for example, or at the very least not right away.

Yes, but peace with Britain gives them almost a year.

As noted above, I strongly doubt that both the Ukraine AND Moscow could be taken in the same campaign;

Not in OTL. But here the game is different.

even allowing for increased manpower,

Which was the main limit. With increased manpower, encricled Russian troops can be eliminated more quickly.

And I think you're seriously underestimating the time it'd take to take Moscow; IOTL, they barely got there at all in 1941. How long do you think the Germans would have to batter it before it gave in? Not as Stalingrad, you say (I'd disagree, Moscow being bigger and better defended), but what, then? A month or two? That's still time for them to freeze and Zhukov to counter-attack.

Stalingrad had major river cutting it, which allowed a nice defensive background. Moscow sits in the middle of a plain. ITTL, they will reach Moscow with more troops, more equipment, less exausted (from more manpower), and yes a couple months in advance. Zhukov may or may not counterattack them in time, but since the Germans are stronger, the counterattack itself will not be nowehere as decisive. The spring will find the Germans still on the outskirts of Moscow anyway, ready to finish the job. With no blockade, no such pressant need for oil in Hitler's mind, so they stay focused on Moscow.

As for oil, Hitler might well find himself in less supply here, as he can't bully Romania into selling Germany its full production on credit. Romania and Hungary might well demand cash for their products, or other securities, and if Hitler fucks with them the British blockade is back in action. Mussolini might transit oil throuh for him, but will it make up for everything that's lost?

Again, Romania will be 100% German sphere of influence. The British successfully bargaining on this is about as likely as them bargaining Romania away from Stalin.

People in the West tend to miss how much of a rout the Winter Offensive really was. The Germans weren't retreating, they were fleeing; only Hitler's stand-firm orders (much-despised in later contexts, but very useful there) prevented an all-out collapse. In addition, much heavy equipment was lost there that couldn't really be replaced (Germany STILL wasn't at full war production by then); Speer lies a lot, but there he was right.

With more men, more equipment, and reaching Moscow rather early, the Germans will be in a much better position to withstand it. It fails to make any substantial gains.

Not that the Japanese Army was very good on the ground (training poor, small arms poor, armour and artillery abysmal), but all right, let's say they mount a major offensive and manage to defeat the local garrisons.

Whopps, we lost Outer Manchuria and Lake Baikal.

Now what? They have an even worse logistics nightmare to contend with than the Germans and suffer the full consequences of winter attack in arctic climate.

They could attack far before, in Summer.

Not pretty. In addition, Stalin never commanded ALL the Siberian divisions to Moscow; the Soviet Far Eastern Command was essentially self-contained, and while it sent reinforcements to the West, it was never broken up.

They are still fighting a two-fronts war. Not so nice for supplies.

And, if worst comes to worst, what'll Stalin do; does he consider the Far East more valuable than Moscow? No. "Fuck this, Georgy Konstantinovich, get everything you can over here now! If the Japanese monkey-men want the frozen tundra, they can have it. For a couple of years, at least..."

Quite possible. Of course, if the Japanese get too close to some of those Siberian factories, or resource-rich areas, the territorial loss will not look so harmless anymore. Also, ITTL, the URSS is fighting a two-fronts war against two major powers alone, with no allies. The perspectives about regaining lost territory do not look so bright anymore.

Of course, all-powerful Russia can pull unlimited amounts of conscripts and weapons outta her big bottom, no matter the number and power of the enemies, don't they ?

Ok, I concede that if worst comes to worst, they could abandon all of Eastern Siberia and the Japanese could never march all the way to Moscow anyway. However, losing say Irkutsk would not be so harmless for Russia.

I think you underestimate the Urals factories.

No, I simply refuse to worship them to the ridiculous proportions Sovietwankers do. Without the industrial basins of Moscow, Ukraine, the Russian heartland, the Soviet Siberian rump would be down to 30-35% of 1941 industrial production, not taking into account the loss of all European Russia resources. Sure, Siberia and Central Asia would have plenty of natural resources (but nowhere as much manpower, sorry) to eventually replenish and exceed lost resources. But by 1941 they were still tapped and accessible (or even known) to a very limited degree. How many decades before they can tap them, with the limited manpower of Siberia and Central Asia, even admitting the latter simply doesn't size the ideal moment to break away from Stalinism, and that the Soviet regime simply doesn't collapse from its obvious massive failure, both very real possibilities ? Do you seriously argument that the Siberian rump could ever hope to keep sustaining a major conventional war against the Greater German Reich, with the trans-Ural manpower and 30% of URSS industry, minus the large swaths of land the Japanese will surely snatch away ?

And regardless, the Germans can't reasonably achieve all that (beginning at the start; they have enough forces to take EITHER Moscow or the Ukraine, and not be certain of it at that) even so.

OTL.

 

[General Zod]

All this assumes a defeatist mentality in Britain.

Defeatism would be accepting a peace that would cede parts of the British Empire, or disarmement. This is acknowledging the reality that the days Britain could keep Europe fragmented by force are over. It is quite regrettable if they make this correct realization by 1940, when the ugly alternative was between giving half of Europe to Nazism or to Stalinism, but the choice was unescapable*, instead of 1914, when they could have helped a civil peaceful liberal hegemony and unity in Europe emerge, with them as co-leaders.

* Or better it was not, but it would have required enlighted statesmen in London and Washington, interested in fostering the true welfare of Europe by means of ensuring the downfall of Nazism through a just negotiated peace with post-Nazi Germany, and the cointainment of Stalinism, instead of waging a fanatical anti-fascist, anti-German crusade over the corpse of Europe. Of course, that was another issue entirely. The choices in 1940 for Britain were very difficult anyway, since it was only luck and Hitler's monumental stupidity that brought American might in Europe. Up to then, the choice was between Nazi hegemony or Soviet one. In all likelihood, the best course would have been to foster mutual exaustion between the two great powers in their inevitable struggle to the death, by carefully balancing their help or hindrance to either side, in order to contain their spread to Central-Eastern Europe, which was beyond any help anyway. Working for and fostering the downfall of either regime, which only would have ensured the hope of a decent livelihood for that part of Europe.

 

[Michele]

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That is not necessary. Really, who could assume that Norwegian or Dutch armies could ever pose a true threat to the Reich. What's truly necessary, for the safety of Germany, is that neither France is allowed to rearm, nor Britain is allowed to station troops in the neutral countries.



Yep. However, once Germany pulls out, she cannot reenter those countries without another war with Britain, and Britain can rearm as much she likes.



Well, really, up to Munich the Western democracies had not really done anything else but allow ethnic Germans to reunite with their homeland: Reinland, Saar, Austria, Sudetenland. Hardly peace at whatever cost. They had been taken by surprise the one moment Germany had truly trespassed (Czechia) and bretrayed pacts and reasonable claims and reacted by going to war over Germany's next claim.



If you wish, they had chosen to be an autonomous vassal, than to refuse to compromise on anything and be destroyed like Poland. One might argue with good reason that had Poland followed the same course, they would have just sacrificed Danzig, the Corridor, and Upper Silesia, and some divisions to fight the URSS alongside Germany, instead of the carnage of occupation. Which was the wisest choice ?



True, true, but the harsh reality is that with the resurgence of German and Soviet power in the '30s, the choice in Central and Eastern Europe was to be a German vassal, or a Soviet vassal. Hope to steer wholly independent of both with Franco-British help was wholly futile. A terrible choice, sure, with the horrible regimes both great powers had in the 30s, but the choice would have existed nonetheless. The power vacuum Versailles had created was artificial and Paris or London could not hope to enforce it forever, short of creating United Europe, or bringing the Americans in the area.

As the outcome of WWII demonstrated, the day Britain could hope or ask and prevent the Continent to unify under one hegemony were over, and had done so since the rise of industrial revolution in Germany, Russia, and the USA. Striving to keep Europe divided among equal powers was futile, they could only expend themselves to substitute one continental hegemony with another: Germany, Russia, the USA, federal Europe. Truly, the options in the 30s sucked, Nazism or Stalinism, but the Britsh elite could only blame themselves for having spawned Hitler from Versailles. They could have had a reasonable co-hegemony with a reasonable and civil Germany a generation before, but they had chosen passive-aggressive France, too weak to ensure any real stable hegemony to Europe, too bullheaded to accept the second-tier rank their resources established. Now, the very most they could do was to keep Western Europe as safe as they could from both ugly regimes, and wait for their decay. As WWII outcome showed, Central and Eastern Europe was unsalvageable anyway.

So what you are suggesting is that instead of waging a war Britain was already in, and rearming as it went ahead, the British should wait for the next time Germany goes aggressive on some neutral, and wage war again then (please don't tell that Germany would have no reason to wage war on neutral Belgium – regardless of the assessment we could make about that now, we should not forget that a) the German leadership was not reasonable and b) the British would not believe Hitler if he said that the sun sets in the West). Of course Britain can rearm in the meantime – and Germany, with a free hand all across the Continent, will have become so strong as to be unstoppable. Of course this would be very much to Hitler's liking, yes. OTOH it's as difficult to sell to Halifax as selling him the Tour Eiffel.

You present the Sudetenland solution exactly in the way the Nazi propaganda saw it. I suppose you do that to present the German point of view, but of course here what matters is the British point of view, not the German one.
And from the British point of view, the Sudetenland wasn't just "letting the Germans go with Germany" at no cost. For starters, the Sudetenland wasn't 100% German; turning it over to Germany meant that other people, the local Czechs, would become the unhappy minority. Additionally, giving Germany the Sudetenland meant, with total certainty, doing away with good defensive land containing good fortifications; and, with high likelihood, putting at risk the existence of the Czechoslovakian state itself. Once you start changing state borders, you don't know where you'll end up. Accepting the Sudetenland solution was not a no-cost idea to the British and even more so to the French.
The same can be said, more or less, for every other German enlargement. The Rhineland was rightly belonging to Germany and any soverign state should be allowed to deploy its own troops in its own territory; that said, it being militarized and fortified was not exactly a no-cost idea to the French, and to the British. Letting a potential enemy increase its manpower pool, as with the Anschluß, also is not a no-cost idea. And so on.

I question that Poland would have fared as well as you claim. The less densely populated territories were very much in the Lebensraum area, to be settled by German "colonists". Additionally, Poles weren't, on Hitler's ledge, on the same rung as Hungarians or Romanians. And, of course, you overlook the fate of Polish Jews, a 10% or so of the population, when you state that there would be no carnage.
That said, the wisest choice was obviously not to let the bully take on the smaller guys one by one, in turn, and even help him; the wisest choice was gang up against the bully.

I question that the Central Europan situation could be described as a power vacuum. Under a rational leadership, Germany could have become a prosperous nation. There was no actual reason why it should start invading every neighbor in sight.
That said, of course Britain and France could have contained German naked aggression. Your words might almost seem to amount to subscribing to a "manifest destiny" theory of German grandeur, which would of course be wrong. In the 1934-37 time frame, they had every possibility to slap back any attempted remilitarization of the Rhineland. Germany would not have had the strength to contest that; and with French units deployed there, the rest of the sequence goes in jeopardy. It was assuming that German intentions were decent and reasonable that brought about the June 1940 situation – another reason not to assume that the motive behind the last appeal to reason by Hitler would be decent and reasonable.

I finally have to question again your interpretation of historical facts. If post-WWII was something, it was divided between two powers, one of which, BTW, wasn't a monolithic dictatorship but an alliance. With the course Halifax is somehow expected to take, that wouldn't be the outcome. The outcome would be a monolithic dictatorship holding sway directly on a big chunk of Europe, with a number of prone vassals here and there. Certainly the outcome of the war wasn't good for Eastern Europe. The outcome that would have resulted in Britain stepping back would have been worse for Europe overall, though.

 

[Churchill]

So what you are suggesting is that instead of waging a war Britain was already in, and rearming as it went ahead, the British should wait for the next time Germany goes aggressive on some neutral, and wage war again then (please don't tell that Germany would have no reason to wage war on neutral Belgium – regardless of the assessment we could make about that now, we should not forget that a) the German leadership was not reasonable and b) the British would not believe Hitler if he said that the sun sets in the West). Of course Britain can rearm in the meantime – and Germany, with a free hand all across the Continent, will have become so strong as to be unstoppable. Of course this would be very much to Hitler's liking, yes. OTOH it's as difficult to sell to Halifax as selling him the Tour Eiffel.

You present the Sudetenland solution exactly in the way the Nazi propaganda saw it. I suppose you do that to present the German point of view, but of course here what matters is the British point of view, not the German one.
And from the British point of view, the Sudetenland wasn't just "letting the Germans go with Germany" at no cost. For starters, the Sudetenland wasn't 100% German; turning it over to Germany meant that other people, the local Czechs, would become the unhappy minority. Additionally, giving Germany the Sudetenland meant, with total certainty, doing away with good defensive land containing good fortifications; and, with high likelihood, putting at risk the existence of the Czechoslovakian state itself. Once you start changing state borders, you don't know where you'll end up. Accepting the Sudetenland solution was not a no-cost idea to the British and even more so to the French.
The same can be said, more or less, for every other German enlargement. The Rhineland was rightly belonging to Germany and any soverign state should be allowed to deploy its own troops in its own territory; that said, it being militarized and fortified was not exactly a no-cost idea to the French, and to the British. Letting a potential enemy increase its manpower pool, as with the Anschluß, also is not a no-cost idea. And so on.

I question that Poland would have fared as well as you claim. The less densely populated territories were very much in the Lebensraum area, to be settled by German "colonists". Additionally, Poles weren't, on Hitler's ledge, on the same rung as Hungarians or Romanians. And, of course, you overlook the fate of Polish Jews, a 10% or so of the population, when you state that there would be no carnage.
That said, the wisest choice was obviously not to let the bully take on the smaller guys one by one, in turn, and even help him; the wisest choice was gang up against the bully.

I question that the Central Europan situation could be described as a power vacuum. Under a rational leadership, Germany could have become a prosperous nation. There was no actual reason why it should start invading every neighbor in sight.
That said, of course Britain and France could have contained German naked aggression. Your words might almost seem to amount to subscribing to a "manifest destiny" theory of German grandeur, which would of course be wrong. In the 1934-37 time frame, they had every possibility to slap back any attempted remilitarization of the Rhineland. Germany would not have had the strength to contest that; and with French units deployed there, the rest of the sequence goes in jeopardy. It was assuming that German intentions were decent and reasonable that brought about the June 1940 situation – another reason not to assume that the motive behind the last appeal to reason by Hitler would be decent and reasonable.

I finally have to question again your interpretation of historical facts. If post-WWII was something, it was divided between two powers, one of which, BTW, wasn't a monolithic dictatorship but an alliance. With the course Halifax is somehow expected to take, that wouldn't be the outcome. The outcome would be a monolithic dictatorship holding sway directly on a big chunk of Europe, with a number of prone vassals here and there. Certainly the outcome of the war wasn't good for Eastern Europe. The outcome that would have resulted in Britain stepping back would have been worse for Europe overall, though.

So what did Britain gain from the war?

 

[Admiral Canaris]

No, I simply refuse to worship them to the ridiculous proportions Sovietwankers do. Without the industrial basins of Moscow, Ukraine, the Russian heartland, the Soviet Siberian rump would be down to 30-35% of 1941 industrial production, not taking into account the loss of all European Russia resources. Sure, Siberia and Central Asia would have plenty of natural resources (but nowhere as much manpower, sorry) to eventually replenish and exceed lost resources. But by 1941 they were still tapped and accessible (or even known) to a very limited degree. How many decades before they can tap them, with the limited manpower of Siberia and Central Asia, even admitting the latter simply doesn't size the ideal moment to break away from Stalinism, and that the Soviet regime simply doesn't collapse from its obvious massive failure, both very real possibilities ? Do you seriously argument that the Siberian rump could ever hope to keep sustaining a major conventional war against the Greater German Reich, with the trans-Ural manpower and 30% of URSS industry, minus the large swaths of land the Japanese will surely snatch away?

I'm pretty sure those additional resources are NOT enough to conquer all of the USSR to the Urals in the first place, especially after the grinding capture of Moscow, Stalingrad etc. In addition to logistics, there's the matter of numbers. Do you know how thinly stretched the Germans were IOTL? The 1942 front was literally a house of cards. Look at when Operation Uranus cut off Stalingrad. The only thing between the Russians and the Black Sea were three weak divisions, one Italian and two Romanian. If the Soviet intelligence had been better, they'd have swept those aside, taken Rostov and cut off all three army groups to the East (A, B and Don). Wow, war over two years earlier.

Total OTL production of tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers by Germany and the USSR by year:

_________Germany_______ USSR

1941 _______3,642 _______5,600
1942 _______5,070 ______28,000
1943_______ 8,975 ______27,300
1944 ______16,374 ______34,700
1945 _______3,817 ______13,500

Sources:

Chamberlin and Doyle. Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two; revised edition, 1993 [German production]

Samuelson, Lennart. Röd koloss på larvfötter; first edition, 1999 [Soviet production]

 

[Churchill]

I'm pretty sure those additional resources are NOT enough to conquer all of the USSR to the Urals in the first place, especially after the grinding capture of Moscow, Stalingrad etc. In addition to logistics, there's the matter of numbers. Do you know how thinly stretched the Germans were IOTL? The 1942 front was literally a house of cards. Look at when Operation Uranus cut off Stalingrad. The only thing between the Russians and the Black Sea were three weak divisions, one Italian and two Romanian. If the Soviet intelligence had been better, they'd have swept those aside, taken Rostov and cut off all three army groups to the East (A, B and Don). Wow, war over two years earlier.

Total OTL production of tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers by Germany and the USSR by year:

_________Germany_______ USSR

1941 _______3,642 _______5,600
1942 _______5,070 ______28,000
1943_______ 8,975 ______27,300
1944 ______16,374 ______34,700
1945 _______3,817 ______13,500

Sources:

Chamberlin and Doyle. Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two; revised edition, 1993 [German production]

Samuelson, Lennart. Röd koloss på larvfötter; first edition, 1999 [Soviet production]

These figures would be very different with more Soviet territory taken early on, Italy not knocked out of the war and German and Romania not bombed.
Not to mention greater axis aircraft use against Soviet tanks.

 

[Churchill]

I'm pretty sure those additional resources are NOT enough to conquer all of the USSR to the Urals in the first place, especially after the grinding capture of Moscow, Stalingrad etc. In addition to logistics, there's the matter of numbers. Do you know how thinly stretched the Germans were IOTL? The 1942 front was literally a house of cards. Look at when Operation Uranus cut off Stalingrad. The only thing between the Russians and the Black Sea were three weak divisions, one Italian and two Romanian. If the Soviet intelligence had been better, they'd have swept those aside, taken Rostov and cut off all three army groups to the East (A, B and Don). Wow, war over two years earlier.

Total OTL production of tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers by Germany and the USSR by year:

_________Germany_______ USSR

1941 _______3,642 _______5,600
1942 _______5,070 ______28,000
1943_______ 8,975 ______27,300
1944 ______16,374 ______34,700
1945 _______3,817 ______13,500

Sources:

Chamberlin and Doyle. Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two; revised edition, 1993 [German production]

Samuelson, Lennart. Röd koloss på larvfötter; first edition, 1999 [Soviet production]

The 1944 figure without war in the west would have been far closer.

 

[Admiral Canaris]

Territorial deals were essentially left out of the armistice, which was a wholly provisional measure intended to last until peace with Britain. Had Britain signed a peace deal, the treaty with France would have followed. Certain territorial losses were only natural,a nd Germany would have beyond any doubt annexed A-L, Lux, quite possibly part of or all of the rest of Lorraine. It was only natural and wise to give equal satifisfaction to old Italian claims, if nothing else because a surly snubbed Mussolini would have given Germany all kinds of headaches in the Balkans and Middle East. For German interests, fer better a loyal, quiet, and satisfied Italy and a slightly surly France, than a surly, diusloyal, and unpredictable Mussolini that could mess with German plans to no end: Greece, anyone ? There is good argument to say that had Mussolini beeen given more satisfying territorial claims into France at the Armistice, he would have never invaded Greece, and spared Germany a lot of Balkan mess.

Vichy France would probably have lost Elsass-Lothringen at least; those were already being de facto incorporated into the Reich, even if they were not formally annexed at Compiègne. Pétain's government might accept that. But large territorial concessions to Mussolini, whom they had beaten in the field, would be much less palatable. Hitler really tried IOTL not to completely antagonise the French and was rather "nice" to them (for being him, at least), which is the reason why Mussolini only got some very small territories in OTL 1940 (larger when Hitler completely occupied France in 1942, but that's another story; those were not annexations even so).

It is exceedingly likely that any kind of peace treaty between Germany and Britain would include definition of spheres of influence to be respected, and this would include the British keeping their noses out of Eastern Europe. That was the whole German war aim.

And Britain would accept this why?

Would he have such influence, without being PM ? I doubt it.

The reason I put this in brackets was because British pressure was far from the only reason for the coup; the Axis was deeply impopular among the officers that made up much of the ruling class of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. A coup might be coming anyway, especially with a Britain not at war that is free to guarantee their independence.

Hmm, in the definition of spheres of influence, the Middle East would surely become an exclusive British zone. Hard to say whether Greece would end up in the British or Axis zone.

I don't think Britain would've accepted massive German gains (ie, making Europe a German dominion).

No, really. Germany would never accept any treaty that would not recognize her exclusive influence over Romania and Bulgaria.

Why does Britain accept a German peace that essentially fulfils all German war aims and none of Britain's?

Well, true, but with the lack of a second war, the difference boils down to trivial.

Are you agreeing or disagreeing with me here?

Anti-partisan troops would still be rather useful.

They can be, but as Michele frequently points out, manpower isn't the major issue for the Germans. Production and logistics are.

So very true, WWII Italian Army was nowhere as comparatively good to the other powers as the WWI one (Benito should have been shot thrice for this ) but at least ITTL they would have lost all those men and equipment in Africa.

Mussolini worked with what he had. And while his government tended to be erratic and underutilised because of his habit of putting on multiple hats, it wasn't extraordinarily bad. The single greatest stupidity was probably shifting from trinary divisions to binary; otherwise, their failures were mostly in modernising their equipment. Italy had a great air force in the '30s, for example, but unfortunately it stayed in the '30s through much of the war. The new, advanced designs around 1942 could never be produced in any great numbers.

They might be allowed to raise troops (under German survelliance) for this scope. Of course, it might be tricky for the terms of the treaty with the British.

With a peace treaty, I suppose there might be a possibility. Still, the Germans will want to control them very carefully.

Not having a naval war, anti-air dfense needs, and another front can help. They need to focus war production on nothing but anti-Russian preparation from Summer 1940 onward.

However, the easy victories would also make the German leadership even less willing to push for increased mobilisation. They'll "get used" to easy Blitzkrieg victories, only more so here than IOTL, and plan accordingly. It is conceivable that, for example, without the air raids, there will be less impetous for increased gun production.

But in the long run it will ameliorate.

Or not; there are limits to what you can do with the Russian climate, especially with sabotage being common (no, partisans aren't tactically useful, but they can be a nagging delaying factor for logistics). Building entirely new roads etc will be expensive, labour-intensive and of dubious use (they'll still be killed by the spring flood).

But you can give them bottom priority, as financing and supplies go.

You can, but why? They were more or less prestige projects to begin with, but that didn't stop their construction IOTL. Here, Hitler will think conquering Europe is Easy Street.

Yes, but peace with Britain gives them almost a year.

The real benefit won't come till later, when the major U-boat drive kicks in. In any case, the entire production run of Mark VIIs cost less than 1 1/2 Bismarck-class battleship.

Not in OTL. But here the game is different.

Not THAT different. The Heer won't increase in size by 50 % or more compared to OTL. And then there's logistics again.

Which was the main limit. With increased manpower, encricled Russian troops can be eliminated more quickly.

Germany had foot troops enough for the initial Barbarossa strike; as long as the operation worked along their Blitzkrieg plans, they had the numbers to pull it off. Once the scedule began lagging, they didn't. Nothing they can reasonably raise due to the POD here will change that. Foot infantry won't be any great help here; what you'd need would be more motorised infantry for the Panzer/motorised units. Essentially, more transportation capacity.

Stalingrad had major river cutting it, which allowed a nice defensive background. Moscow sits in the middle of a plain. ITTL, they will reach Moscow with more troops, more equipment, less exausted (from more manpower), and yes a couple months in advance. Zhukov may or may not counterattack them in time, but since the Germans are stronger, the counterattack itself will not be nowehere as decisive. The spring will find the Germans still on the outskirts of Moscow anyway, ready to finish the job. With no blockade, no such pressant need for oil in Hitler's mind, so they stay focused on Moscow.

More manpower won't remove the fatigue of marching all the way, or of fighting at every step. The Barbarossa Heer isn't the US Army; you don't go home on leave every two months. The logistics will be busy just getting them the fuel and ammunition they'll need.

Frankly, why is the river so crucial? It allowed for transportation so the city was never ENTIRELY cut off, yes, but that'd be true for Moscow as well; surrounding it completely will take time, especially at the forefront. And Leningrad also didn't have a major river to defend it like that.

The OTL counterattack was decisive because the German troops were exhausted and undersupplied, not because they had greatly inferior numbers. Under such conditions, overstretched and fighting enemies who knew winter combat well, how long could they hold? It will be the same as OTL, only they lose more equipment.

Again, Romania will be 100% German sphere of influence. The British successfully bargaining on this is about as likely as them bargaining Romania away from Stalin.

How likely is Britain screwing all of Europe over? They'd made guarantees to Romania, too, like they had to Poland, though we don't hear too much of that today.

With more men, more equipment, and reaching Moscow rather early, the Germans will be in a much better position to withstand it. It fails to make any substantial gains.

See above.

Whopps, we lost Outer Manchuria and Lake Baikal.

Yes, because the Japanese advanced faster than the Germans...

They could attack far before, in Summer.

They wouldn't in at least a few months; they'd want to see that the enemy was thoroughly beaten, first (as was their reasoning with the nearby European possessions). That, and getting everything into place. If they believe the German propaganda, they might attack at some point in the autumn. Only everyone knows that's a stupid time to launch attacks...

They are still fighting a two-fronts war. Not so nice for supplies.

Actually, the Russians knew the Trans-Siberian railway couldn't carry anywhere near the supplies needed for a military campaign. Which was why they built up a separate munitions complex for the Far Eastern Command. They had their own factories independent of those in the west.

Quite possible. Of course, if the Japanese get too close to some of those Siberian factories, or resource-rich areas, the territorial loss will not look so harmless anymore. Also, ITTL, the URSS is fighting a two-fronts war against two major powers alone, with no allies. The perspectives about regaining lost territory do not look so bright anymore.

Japan is already bogged down in China. How many divisions can they muster - twenty to thirty, perhaps, with piss-poor equipment? There is every reason to believe they wouldn't get too far with them; as we know, Stalin never IOTL transferred ALL the Siberian divisions...

Of course, all-powerful Russia can pull unlimited amounts of conscripts and weapons outta her big bottom, no matter the number and power of the enemies, don't they ?

No, but a Japanese front isn't too major an obstacle for them; Soviet war planning ever since the '30s had assumed that the next war would be two-front between Europe and Japan.

Ok, I concede that if worst comes to worst, they could abandon all of Eastern Siberia and the Japanese could never march all the way to Moscow anyway. However, losing say Irkutsk would not be so harmless for Russia.

To give up the East is far from the most likely Soviet course; I mentioned it as a "failsafe". The Japanese very likely won't win any major victories against thegarrisons that are left.

 

[Admiral Canaris]

No, I simply refuse to worship them to the ridiculous proportions Sovietwankers do. Without the industrial basins of Moscow, Ukraine, the Russian heartland, the Soviet Siberian rump would be down to 30-35% of 1941 industrial production, not taking into account the loss of all European Russia resources. Sure, Siberia and Central Asia would have plenty of natural resources (but nowhere as much manpower, sorry) to eventually replenish and exceed lost resources. But by 1941 they were still tapped and accessible (or even known) to a very limited degree. How many decades before they can tap them, with the limited manpower of Siberia and Central Asia, even admitting the latter simply doesn't size the ideal moment to break away from Stalinism, and that the Soviet regime simply doesn't collapse from its obvious massive failure, both very real possibilities ? Do you seriously argument that the Siberian rump could ever hope to keep sustaining a major conventional war against the Greater German Reich, with the trans-Ural manpower and 30% of URSS industry, minus the large swaths of land the Japanese will surely snatch away ?

Addendum: There were pre-war Soviet plans to evacuate major industries Eastwards in case of war. The State Defence Committee (GKO) had already drawn up a system of "doubles" for various industries that were situated in "threatened border areas" (per pre-1939 borders); in case the original facility was threatened, it would be vacated to its "double" farther inland. The equipment and skilled workers of more than one thousand factories were evacuated from the Ukraine and Western Russia to Siberia and the Urals in the winter of 1941-2 alone.

 

[Admiral Canaris]

These figures would be very different with more Soviet territory taken early on, Italy not knocked out of the war and German and Romania not bombed.

These figures consider Germany alone. Italy and Romania don't matter here.

Not to mention greater axis aircraft use against Soviet tanks.

That still doesn't affect production, though it may affect the course of the war. How many more aircraft does Barbarossa get from BoB and Africa not happening? What were the losses in the Blitz, on the order of fifteen hundred? (Going by memory, I'll check and be back.) Germany built 80,000 airplanes in the last three years of the war; about 70,000 of them were destroyed in the East.

The 1944 figure without war in the west would have been far closer.

Define "far". Strategic bombing was making a real impact by then, yes, but there are also various other factors (eg, severe resource shortages) to consider.

 

[Fletch]

France is fallen, Britain is alone, and America shall never join a war in Europe unless it's attacked. That's the picture in Summer 1940. The British people has tried to stop Germany's expansion in Central-Eastern Europe, and it has failed, over and over (Norway, Benelux, France). If they are offered a decent peace deal, instead of an uphill struggle with no end or ally in sight, why shouldn't grasp it ? Sure, Hitler is wholly untrustworthy, so they will rearm, fortify their Isles and their Empire, and keep prepared.

So the British sit back, watching the crocodile devour other states, hoping it will eat them last?

 

[Michele]

So what did Britain gain from the war?

When one tries to assess the decisions of the decision-makers, one should first choose whether he's judging them with the benefit of hindsight, or not. If we are trying to assess the British decision to keep waging war in 1940 with a view to different decisions that might have possibly have been taken then, IMHO, we must not make use of our hindsight but judge the options on the basis of what was known at the time of the decision.

 

[Fletch]

Defeatism would be accepting a peace that would cede parts of the British Empire, or disarmement. This is acknowledging the reality that the days Britain could keep Europe fragmented by force are over. It is quite regrettable if they make this correct realization by 1940, when the ugly alternative was between giving half of Europe to Nazism or to Stalinism, but the choice was unescapable*, instead of 1914, when they could have helped a civil peaceful liberal hegemony and unity in Europe emerge, with them as co-leaders.

So Britain was at fault for the German invasion of Belgium?

As far as Britain was concerned, Germany had total war guilt due to that fact.(This is not to say Germany had total war guilt for the conflict, but so far as British entry goes, they did.)

 

[Wozza]

What a load of rubbhish

Defeatism would be accepting a peace that would cede parts of the British Empire, or disarmement. This is acknowledging the reality that the days Britain could keep Europe fragmented by force are over.

Funny, there was I thinking that people were using force to unite Europe, but there was me forgetting that the two world wars started when Britain and France refused to acknowledge the Great Vote for European Unity.

It is quite regrettable if they make this correct realization by 1940, when the ugly alternative was between giving half of Europe to Nazism or to Stalinism, but the choice was unescapable*, instead of 1914, when they could have helped a civil peaceful liberal hegemony and unity in Europe emerge, with them as co-leaders. .

What a pile of steeming crap. There was nothing liberal about Imperial Germany - the German speaking Alsatians still wanted to be part of France for God's sake. This regime liberally uniting Europe could not have kept its own country together voluntarily. This is nothing but ignorant apologia for an aggressive, militaristic and increasingly anti-semitic regime.

* Or better it was not, but it would have required enlighted statesmen in London and Washington, interested in fostering the true welfare of Europe by means of ensuring the downfall of Nazism through a just negotiated peace with post-Nazi Germany, and the cointainment of Stalinism, instead of waging a fanatical anti-fascist, anti-German crusade over the corpse of Europe. Of course, that was another issue entirely. The choices in 1940 for Britain were very difficult anyway, since it was only luck and Hitler's monumental stupidity that brought American might in Europe. Up to then, the choice was between Nazi hegemony or Soviet one. In all likelihood, the best course would have been to foster mutual exaustion between the two great powers in their inevitable struggle to the death, by carefully balancing their help or hindrance to either side, in order to contain their spread to Central-Eastern Europe, which was beyond any help anyway. Working for and fostering the downfall of either regime, which only would have ensured the hope of
a decent livelihood for that part of Europe.

Right

a) British plans until about 1943 did involve negotiaiton with a post-Nazi leadership

b) These were no more realistic than your bleatings. German conservatives, nationalists and generals dreamed of a powerful, territorially militaristic and undemocratic Germany

c) The prospect of a "war of mutual exhaustion" is a morally vile one, and would essentially be colluding in the Nazi genocides, including the Judeocide. It would have surrended the moral authority of democracy to communism for decades.

As we have seen from more recent effors to do this it would also be a high risk game that could easily lead to worse outcomes.

 

[Admiral Canaris]

What a pile of steeming crap. There was nothing liberal about Imperial Germany - the German speaking Alsatians still wanted to be part of France for God's sake. This regime liberally uniting Europe could not have kept its own country together voluntarily. This is nothing but ignorant apologia for an aggressive, militaristic and increasingly anti-semitic regime.

Compared to Russia, it was fairly liberal... otherwise, no; the Kaiser's powers were still too great for it to be even a democracy.

Where'd you get anti-Semitic from, though? It's not necessarily wrong - I'm no expert on pre-war Germany - but I haven't heard that before. A bit of the same with "aggressive"; it was, but was it much more so than its neighbours?

b) These were no more realistic than your bleatings. German conservatives, nationalists and generals dreamed of a powerful, territorially militaristic and undemocratic Germany

No arguments. However, late in the war an autocratic Germany might still be better than massive Communist expansion. That would probably depend on the more precise mix of nationalists and autocrats in the junta that took over.

 

[Churchill]

When one tries to assess the decisions of the decision-makers, one should first choose whether he's judging them with the benefit of hindsight, or not. If we are trying to assess the British decision to keep waging war in 1940 with a view to different decisions that might have possibly have been taken then, IMHO, we must not make use of our hindsight but judge the options on the basis of what was known at the time of the decision.

Nothing to do with hindsight.
Many people opposed Britains entry to the war including the King, former King, most the aristocracy and much of the press.
Right up till war was declared they where peace rallies hundreds of thousands strong in London.

 

[Wozza]

Nothing to do with hindsight.
Many people opposed Britains entry to the war including the King, former King, most the aristocracy and much of the press.
Right up till war was declared they where peace rallies hundreds of thousands strong in London.

No, really no, not in 1939, the need to stop Hitler was accepted, a year earlier was a different matter. Certainly there was not war enthusiasm.

 

[Slacker]

I've noticed a mistaken assumption people are running with here-according to Holy Fox, a book on Halifax, Labour WOULD have supported him as Prime Minister. It's been a year since I read it, so I'm not sure about the Liberals, but to be blunt, they don't matter. Halifax had a pretty good working relationship with Labour.