WI Lord Halifax is appointed PM in 1940?
- Thread starter Don_Giorgio
- Start date
Which they would and could not be certain of, as any potential peace deal between the UK and Germany would almost certainly keep this clause secret. Besides, they would potentially have equally as much to lose. I suspect calmer heads would have prevailed in the Turkish government. By any means this is totally uncertain, and IMO unlikely.
I refer you to the Battle of Kalkhin Gol. Following their defeat, the Japanese decided that they would change tactics and never attack the Soviets again.Churchill said:
So again, uncertain, and IMO unlikely.
Hitlers aim was the Urals. That was the aim of Barbarossa to my knowledge. The Soviets would never accept this. As such any peace is unlikely. The Germans would never, IMO accept terms with the Soviets unless the Nazi Empire was threatened from the west.Churchill said:
If you accept the was was one of racism and imperialism, then you must see the Nazi viewpoint of distaste for negotiating with subhumans(in their view). As there can be no negotiation, do you deny the Soviets would win a long term war with Germany?Churchill said:
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Admiral Canaris
Banned
Actually, his opinion of Britain had changed a lot by then, as von Ribbentrop had spent the last few years regaling him with stories of how decadent and judaised the British were: According to him, it was ruled by quasi-Bolsheviks and a cosmopolitan, Francophile elite of degenerate nobles and Jewish businessmen. von Ribbentrop hated England a LOT after they'd made fun of him during his tour as Ambassador...
General Zod
Banned
It is those hyperblown statements about "invincible" and "unconquerable" USSR no matter the odds that make me find Sovietwank insufferable. First, if the Germans really took Moscow and the Russian heartland (i.e. the front on the Volga), the rump USSR is truly royally fucked, as they have lost all their European major manpower and industrial centers. With what they still have in Siberia and Central Asia, they are down to the level of Spain as manpower goes and Italy as industry goes, in no way able to sustain any kind of major conventional warfare. Sure, they have the stretegic depth and residual resources to retreat on the Urals and wage a mega-Vietnam guerrilla campaign against the Wehrmacht, which might become a serious attrition problem for the Germans in say 10-20 years (the Fatherland scenario). If anything, the Wehrmacht will have a bigger mega-Afghanistan guerrilla problems from all those Russian peasants in occupied territories who object to be exterminated to make room for German Lebenstraum, but that's another matter. But as long as any form of WWII major conventional warfare is concerned, the days of the USSR as any kind of great power and signfiicant threat to the Nazi Empire are truly over the moment the Whermacht reaches the Volga. There is no way in Hell or Heaven the manpower and industry of Siberia and central Asia can ever get remotely close the one of the Greater German Reich.
Besides, this specific scenario is truly a dream one as far as Barbarossa is concerned: Britain out of the war in mid-40, so no occupation of the Balkans, no North Africa, Italy, or France fronts, no strategic bombing, no occupation of France, no anti-air personnel, and the German industry can draw on its full capabilities, plus the ones of Norway, Italy, France, and Benelux, to arm the Wehrmacht. Hitelr here is the unquestioned master of the European continent, so the populace of Europe will be much more amenable to their fascist vassal regimes, and Germany can draw a substantial amount of manpower from France, Spain, Italy. Industrially, it's the whole capability of Western Europe vs. Soviet Union. And it's almost a given that with these odds, the Wehrmacht will penetrate much more in depth than OTL. The more they advance, the less the Russians have available in terms of manpower and industry. When the Wehrmacht reaches the Volga, it's endgame.
Admiral Canaris
Banned
So how does the Reich conquer the Ukraine if it sends it main force to Moscow as was originally planned? (I assume you don't think they could've managed both that and the Pocket) Why do the German forces survive the winter much better in this scenario? Why isn't taking Moscow house-by-house holy hell? And with more troops in the field, doesn't issues like, say, logistics get worse, not better?
The USSR can't be conquered by the technology the Germans have available. In everything, from climate to size to societal organisation, it's optimised for defence.
General Zod
Banned
Well, since Hitler was genuinely willing to have peace with the British, I can see German negotiators be eventually amenable to concede Belgium, Netherlands, and Norway political autonomy (i.e. no imposition of fascist regimes), as long as they keep strict neutrality and economic cooperation with Germany. Nazi ambitions on these states were rather peripheral anyway.
As it concerns France, well, Vichy regime is already in charge and it occurred by homegrown French political developments in the face of the defeat, it was not really imposed by German bayonets like collaborators in Netherlands, Belgium, or Norway. French far right simply seized the right moment to claim power, but in the face of French exaustion after the defeat, it had a genuine following. At the peace table, it would be quite specious for Britain to deny it legitimation, and the moment the UK starts peace negotiations, De Gaulle and Free France are a political nullity and a lonesome rogue general. Their only legitimacy came from British belligerance, or an uphill political battle to claim French public opinion back away from allegiance to Petain, which was years in the making (until 1943-44, French Resistance had a fringe following).
No doubt that Germany and Italy will claim a redress of Versailles' wrongs and satisfaction of their long-standing irredentist and colonial claims against France: at the very least, this means Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg to Germany, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunis, and Dijbouti to Italy, plus huge military limitations to France to ensure it does not be any menace to Axis anymore, enough to administer her colonial empire and no more. Of course, if Vichy France is willing to lend an hand in the coming anti-Bolshevik crusade (as it shall most likely be), some of those limitations will be lifted.
A German Empire in Central and Eastern Europe was Hitler's whole war aim, and if Britain truly wants peace at this point, recognizing this will be unavoidable: anyway, since Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians chose German vassaldom of this own will, this essentially amounts to acknowledging German suzerainety over Czechia and Poland and strict neutrality between Germany and URSS in any coming confrontation. With the difference of Vichy France (which arguably, brought defeat on her own head by choosing war), it's not really different from what Britain would have reaped had she chosen not to give any garantee to Poland in 1939.
Once Britain makes the decision to seek peace over all-out war (which amounts to acknowledgement that the balance of power in Europe is an obsolete concept and sparing the dwindling resources of the British Empire is preferable to spending them to try and reverse a German hegemony over Europe which already exists), this is the kind of peace deal that would emerge.
General Zod
Banned
First, if Britain truly signs peace in mid-1940, no Balkans, Mussolini will be given his pound of flesh from French territory and colonies and will be busy assembling troops to take part in the anti-bolshevik crusade, or even if sends an ultimatum to Greece, without British help, the Greeks will rush to grant him anything. Ditto for Jugoslavia entering the Triparite PAct. Not to do so would be suicidal. This means the Wehrmacht can attack the moment they prefer, enough time to take the pocket and turn towards Moscow earlier before winter.
Second, in this scenario, I expect army-size expedition corps from Spain, Italy, and Vichy France. Even Turkey joining the Axis is not unreasonable by this point, if Hitler promises them the West Caucasus (he wanted the Baku oil and Ukraine). Even more troops for the Axis.
Third, logistics is not a God-given physical constant: more Axis manpower means more personnel to clear, build, and adapt railroads. And more troops to clear the partisans.
Fourth: with more troops, and more weapons and equipment since no war production would have been wasted for a naval campaign against Britain, the Germans are in a far better position to occupy the whole of Ukraine and reach Moscow, and withstand Zhukov's counterattack. Truly, contending Moscow will be a urban house-by-house hell, but nowhere as bad as Stalingrad, since the Russians won't have a major river at their backs. Zhukov's counterattack will be the Russians racking the (momentary) bottom of their manpower barrel, before the 1942 conscripts rush in (and less of them, since the Axis is in Moscow and on the Don).
Even if Zhukov's counterattack stops the pressure on Moscow momentarily, it will push the Germans much less further away, with more troops and equipment the Germans are poised to finish the job in Spring 1942 admitting the counterattack really succeeds. If Turkey is Axis, major front in the Caucasus, so no troops for Zhukov, goodbye Moscow. In this scenario, Hitler is suffering no blockade, so he has more access to oil, so he is less anxious to get Baku at the expense of Moscow. OTOH, admittedly, if Turkey is attacking from the south, going for the Caucasus makes somewhat more sense. Losing Baku would still be a severe loss for the URSS, but quite proabably noot so bad as losing Moscow and the Russian heartland.
Fifth: Kalkin Gol or no Kalkin Gol, in this scenario, it makes rather more sense for the Japanese to backstab a weakened Russia with a two-front war than picking a war with a British Empire and a USA which can direct theri whole intact combined might against them. Whereas, in 1941 the URSS can spare no troops in the Far East besides the ones already garrisoning the border. Whereas the Japanese have no such problem. If the Japanese attack, no Zhukov counterattack, so Moscow eventually falls (house-by-house figthing are costly, but without a relief, the defenders ultiamtely fail). No Moscow, and a two-front war, the URSS is KO.
The Germans don't need to conquer ALL of the URSS. They just need to take Ukraine, Moscow, and the Russian heartland, up to the Volga. Without these, Russia has neither the manpower nor the industrial potential to continue any serious conventional war with the Greater German Reich with Siberia and Central Asia (not to mention the Japaneese would be truly stupid not to seize Outer Manchuria and Eastern Siberia, so the Soviet Rump will only have Western Siberia and Central Asia, admitting the latter's nationalists don't get funny ideas..). It quickly becomes a mop-up operation from the Volga to the Urals. At that point, either the Russians beg for peace, or it becomes a long-term Vietnam-style guerrilla war on the Urals between the Siberian rump (which by now will be down to a regional power as manpower and industry goes). Quite probably a big cumulative attrition headache for the Wehrmacht in a decade or two, but conventional war is essentially over.
Of course, the Wehrmacht will have even more attrition headaches from all those Salv partisans who have objections to roll over and die to make room for Lebenstraum colonists, but again, it's a big counterguerrilla problem, the big conventional war is over. Unless one assumes a Siberian rump with the manpower and industry of Italy (to be generous) may be any problem for the whole Wehrmacht. Their only hope is if they can get nuclear weapons before Germany (rather questionable Siberian rump, with all the post-defeat economic and political chaos, can develop the Bomb before Germany).
General Zod
Banned
True but trivial. By all accounts, Hitler in mid 1940 was very eager to get Britain to the peace table so he could have hands free for Russia and very marginally interested in any concessions from the British besides acknowledgement of his victory over France and hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe.
I would agree with this. The UK would simply be demanding more than Germany would be willing to provide.
If Germany is truly interested in a peace with the United Kingdom, it should have released Poland minus Posen and Danzig and accepted Neville Chamberlain's offer of an "Easy Peace", which would probably be more likely than a peace deal where the UK would have to, at some degree, hand over Indonesia and the Congo into German Puppet Regimes.
Halifax would have been willing to waver where Churchill had stood firm, but even Halifax would not be willing to make peace with these concessions. Indeed, Halifax would probably demand Poland's return and find that Hitler would never allow it. And then it would be over.
As for why Halifax and the USA would not get along, this is modeled on his role as lead diplomat to the USA, where he had several gaffes and embarrassments. I take the view that the people in similar situations would cause similar results, so I'd expect a problem.
Who would be in Halifax’ government? The Tories who deserted Chamberlain and wanted Churchill as PM were talking with and being supported by, the Liberals and Labour. The latter agreed to a government of national unity if Churchill was PM but they indicated they would not accept Halifax.
If Halifax won the premiership his own party would be split and he would not necessarily have a working majority in the Commons. What would he do? If he called an election, even if it were possible to do so in this crisis, the result would probably be the decimation of the Conservatives.
For the sake of argument even if he succeeded in a vote of confidence in the House, what could he expect from Hitler? Any British PM who stood up and waved a treaty around proclaiming this meant peace with honour with Germany is impossible after Chamberlain.
There would need to be iron clad promises backed up by action like the immediate withdrawal of German military forces from France and from any other country where their presence could threaten Britain. Not going to happen. The removal of any German and their allied airforces from within range of the UK. No way. Some way to neutralise the threat of German naval vessels against the RN and merchant marine. Hitler would never agree. To top it all off the Italian navy would need to be neutralised as well as the army presence in Africa. Unlikely in the extreme.
Why would the British government and more importantly the people accept anything else after the continual broken agreements?
If Halifax won the premiership his own party would be split and he would not necessarily have a working majority in the Commons. What would he do? If he called an election, even if it were possible to do so in this crisis, the result would probably be the decimation of the Conservatives.
For the sake of argument even if he succeeded in a vote of confidence in the House, what could he expect from Hitler? Any British PM who stood up and waved a treaty around proclaiming this meant peace with honour with Germany is impossible after Chamberlain.
There would need to be iron clad promises backed up by action like the immediate withdrawal of German military forces from France and from any other country where their presence could threaten Britain. Not going to happen. The removal of any German and their allied airforces from within range of the UK. No way. Some way to neutralise the threat of German naval vessels against the RN and merchant marine. Hitler would never agree. To top it all off the Italian navy would need to be neutralised as well as the army presence in Africa. Unlikely in the extreme.
Why would the British government and more importantly the people accept anything else after the continual broken agreements?
I have to say I find you use certain adverbs with quite fanciful meanings, apparently.
Hitler "genuinely" wanted peace with Britain. Yes, that's true, provided that the British were willing to hand him everything he wanted on a silver platter. That's "genuinely wanting peace" with Hitler. Yes, he might have offered, say, Norwegian or Dutch neutrality. So what? He would have not disarmed, of course, but he would have wanted the Norwegians and Dutch disarmed. In other words, he could have come back whenever he wanted. And who, in Europe, could trust Hitler only on his word? Nobody who wasn't a fool, certainly not Halifax.
If Britain "truly" wanted peace. Here "truly" actually means "at whatever cost". Going for peace at whatever cost had been tried, and proved foolish.
Romanians accepted vassaldom to Germany "of their own will". Here, the meaning is "at gunpoint", and anyway that took place after the moment in which Halifax could have become British Prime Minister. Back in March 1939, Romania had asked the British for help against the German demand of a position of monopoly as to the Romanian foreign trade, and the fame of the British guarantee to Poland tends to make obscure the fact that Romania was also given guarantees. Romania chose the German side because otherwise it would have ended like Poland. They would have been way happier without German meddling.
A final remark: why should Britain accept German hegemony? Only because it had been tentatively achieved, not earlier than a month before, and which was far from proven that it could be self-supporting? But Britain in the past had had way more of an empire overseas, and had never ever accepted the hegemony of one Continental country, and for very good reasons. It had opposed Spain and France. Trying to argue that having one lone Continental superpower was actually good for Britain really doesn't hold water – and even if it did in theory, it runs entirely against the grain of centuries of British foreign policies. Traditions which were probably much more ingrained in Halifax than in the less conventional Churchill, BTW.
Hitler "genuinely" wanted peace with Britain. Yes, that's true, provided that the British were willing to hand him everything he wanted on a silver platter. That's "genuinely wanting peace" with Hitler. Yes, he might have offered, say, Norwegian or Dutch neutrality. So what? He would have not disarmed, of course, but he would have wanted the Norwegians and Dutch disarmed. In other words, he could have come back whenever he wanted. And who, in Europe, could trust Hitler only on his word? Nobody who wasn't a fool, certainly not Halifax.
If Britain "truly" wanted peace. Here "truly" actually means "at whatever cost". Going for peace at whatever cost had been tried, and proved foolish.
Romanians accepted vassaldom to Germany "of their own will". Here, the meaning is "at gunpoint", and anyway that took place after the moment in which Halifax could have become British Prime Minister. Back in March 1939, Romania had asked the British for help against the German demand of a position of monopoly as to the Romanian foreign trade, and the fame of the British guarantee to Poland tends to make obscure the fact that Romania was also given guarantees. Romania chose the German side because otherwise it would have ended like Poland. They would have been way happier without German meddling.
A final remark: why should Britain accept German hegemony? Only because it had been tentatively achieved, not earlier than a month before, and which was far from proven that it could be self-supporting? But Britain in the past had had way more of an empire overseas, and had never ever accepted the hegemony of one Continental country, and for very good reasons. It had opposed Spain and France. Trying to argue that having one lone Continental superpower was actually good for Britain really doesn't hold water – and even if it did in theory, it runs entirely against the grain of centuries of British foreign policies. Traditions which were probably much more ingrained in Halifax than in the less conventional Churchill, BTW.
I seem to recall that part of the situation was Halifax himself not wanting the job. It could be the case that Neville Chamberlain, facing removal, pulls all of the strings he can and puts Halifax in power. Halifax, thence weakened, tries to create a "War Government" as Churchill did OTL. Churchill himself could be the Defense Minister, I would suspect that Anthony Eden would also return to government, as he had bravely resigned over appeasement. Finally, the political left would be included, so Clement Atlee would be in there as well.
Halifax might be considered "Dovish" in British Politics and Germany, but he would not be surrounded by more doves in a crisis government. I think that Halifax's government would not only not survive if he attempted to force a peace deal with Hitler, I think this would cause a political crisis to the point of ripping his political party apart. The people of Great Britain were furious over Hitler's betrayal of the Munich agreement, and I suspect that fury was dominant politically even during the worst days of the Blitz, and probably would have been even if Halifax would have been in power.
Not only would a UK peace deal in 1940 have been national suicide, it would also have been political suicide. There will be no arrangement based on trusting Hitler.
Admiral Canaris
Banned
Why is Vichy France accepting large concessions to Italy? They're beaten, but not yet complete tools; if Hitler does hand "Il Musse" Nice and Savoy, for example, or Tunisia, that'll make them angry, even if they can't resist directly. Hitler was (being him) pretty nice to Vichy at first, because he wanted a stable puppet, not an occupied state in rebellion (and, from what we see of Vichy, it mostly worked). Why does he reconsider drastically because Britain is beaten? He thought they were already when he made the decision IOTL.
Why is Yugoslavia more willing to support Germany here than IOTL? They're actually better off for British guarantees; remember, Britain has a negotiated peace, not an unconditioal surrender. If the British recognise the new Yugoslavian government and promise it protection, they're better off than they were IOTL, as Hitler will at least consider not wanting trouble from Britain again. And as noted, Britain will be in a "Cold War" at best with Germany; they'll guarantee the independence of anyone that's still independent.
(I suppose you could argue that the Yugoslavian coup wouldn't be sponsored by Britain with Halifax in charge, and thus might not go off, but that's no certainty, especially with Churchill still in the government.)
Likewise, why won't Britain defend Greece's neutrality under these circumstances, assuming that Mussolini would even dare mess with them for fear of provoking a conflict with Britain (he was much more cautious than Adolph)? Hell, I could make the case that Romania and Bulgaria wouldn't join the Axis here if there are believable British guarantees made for them;at the very least, Hitler might thread a little more carefully around them a little longer.
Finally, how much earlier do you intend the Germans to attack the USSR? The original starting date is a dream, what with the spring flood and all. The best you could hope for is probably something in early June, and a couple of weeks might not make all the difference between victory and defeat.
Turkey was very neutral, so it's not all that likely that they join, and the value of their forces in a modern war is doubtful; at best, they could serve as occupation/anti-partisan troops. Likewise, the Italian divisions were a mess - too small, too little artillery and support, bad armour throughout; some units like the Alpini were good, but most were mediocre or worse - and Vichy France wasn't allowed an army under the terms; in any case, the Germans used their equipment to good effect themselves.
This brings us back to the point Michele usually raises, and may already have, here (as you know, there are a couple of different threads on this topic right now): the Germans' major problem was never manpower, but equipment and materiel. Volkssturm? Think of Enemy at the Gates, that's what it was like - "You there! Here's a brassard and a rifle! You - here's a brassard and the ammo, don't go too far from the guy with the rifle!"
But the troops will themselves need to be supplied, making the situation worse in the short run, even if it does improve in the long run (you're somewhat aware, I take it, of the time it takes to build roads - it isn't done in weeks, or even months in most cases). Railroad is an ever bigger bitch, and on top of that there's a German lack of trains and rolling stock.
The real industrial drain for Germany that the Navy was responsible for was the surface ships (esp prestige projects - heavy ships like the Tirpitz), and those wouldn't have been called off just like that. The surface fleet orders were pretty stable; what increased was U-boat production. You could take away some, or even most, of that, I suppose. Still, it's not a huge boon, especially as one must take into account that production lines aren't retooled that easily; a naval yard can't necessarily build tanks, for example, or at the very least not right away.
As noted above, I strongly doubt that both the Ukraine AND Moscow could be taken in the same campaign; even allowing for increased manpower, there are other limits. Light infantry isn't good for much if it isn't supported by something more solid, and it certainly isn't strategically fast if it goes on foot. And I think you're seriously underestimating the time it'd take to take Moscow; IOTL, they barely got there at all in 1941. How long do you think the Germans would have to batter it before it gave in? Not as Stalingrad, you say (I'd disagree, Moscow being bigger and better defended), but what, then? A month or two? That's still time for them to freeze and Zhukov to counter-attack.
Contrary to the Draka books, the Caucasus is not easily invaded from the South, with its mountainous terrain; that front isn't mentioned much in the histories, but was about as hopeless as Italy in WWI. Turkey's outdated army would not bind up any comparatively large RKKA divisions. As for oil, Hitler might well find himself in less supply here, as he can't bully Romania into selling Germany its full production on credit. Romania and Hungary might well demand cash for their products, or other securities, and if Hitler fucks with them the British blockade is back in action. Mussolini might transit oil throuh for him, but will it make up for everything that's lost?
People in the West tend to miss how much of a rout the Winter Offensive really was. The Germans weren't retreating, they were fleeing; only Hitler's stand-firm orders (much-despised in later contexts, but very useful there) prevented an all-out collapse. In addition, much heavy equipment was lost there that couldn't really be replaced (Germany STILL wasn't at full war production by then); Speer lies a lot, but there he was right.
Not that the Japanese Army was very good on the ground (training poor, small arms poor, armour and artillery abysmal), but all right, let's say they mount a major offensive and manage to defeat the local garrisons. Now what? They have an even worse logistics nightmare to contend with than the Germans and suffer the full consequences of winter attack in arctic climate. Not pretty. In addition, Stalin never commanded ALL the Siberian divisions to Moscow; the Soviet Far Eastern Command was essentially self-contained, and while it sent reinforcements to the West, it was never broken up.
And, if worst comes to worst, what'll Stalin do; does he consider the Far East more valuable than Moscow? No. "Fuck this, Georgy Konstantinovich, get everything you can over here now! If the Japanese monkey-men want the frozen tundra, they can have it. For a couple of years, at least..."
I think you underestimate the Urals factories. And regardless, the Germans can't reasonably achieve all that (beginning at the start; they have enough forces to take EITHER Moscow or the Ukraine, and not be certain of it at that) even so.
I am not so sure about that... British involved in Greece only after Metaxas's death in 29 January 1941... till that date Greece was fighting Italy by itself... No British troops nor Royal Navy were allowed by Metaxas to enter Greece because he didnt wanted to attract Hitler to attack him...
There is a rumour circulating till today that Metaxas was poisoned by a British agent in order that his successor along with the Anglophile King George II allow British troops to enter Greece...
Plus if Metaxas (being an admirer of the German model) rushed to give everything to Italy he would have faced popular uprising... He had faced one in Crete in 1937 and he wouldnt have risked another...
I agree with most of your post but I am far from convinced that Labour would join a National Unity Government if Halifax was PM. It wasn't ideological (Labour despised Churchill after all) but because Halifax was seen as too weak to be a war leader. His sitting in the Lords did not help and this should not be overlooked.
Even if he were somehow drafted to the PMs job, Halifax himself apparently did not have the stomach for doing the hard yards needed to pull Britain together and fight the war. The rebels in the Tories gravitated around Churchill for a reason it was not just an anyone but Chamberlain movement. Labour had to support a Tory as PM but this not mean it had to be just anyone. Churchill was the only candidate who could fulfil the requirements of all the parties in 1940.
Churchill
Banned
Japanesse Imperial Headquarters ordered the implementation of the revised policy toward the Soviet Union by commencing large scale reinforcements of the Kantogun. To keep the true reasons secret, the build-up was called the "Special Manoeuvers of Kantogun". The 400,600 troops of the Kantogun suddenly rose to over 700,000 and some billion Yen in military funds were allocated. These manoeuvres prepared the use of force against Soviet Union, based upon the prospect that the Russo-German war might rapidly take a favorable turn for Germany. In the event that force was used against the USSR, the new operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simultaneous offensives were to be mounted north and east from Manchuria. Additionally the new plan included landings in Soviet Far East islands and coastal areas, and land operations in Outer Mongolia. Japan also had in Manchuria 150,000 to 200,000 troops.
The Imperial Army anticipated the German offensive to commence in 1941-42. The Russians had to transfer several divisions from the Far East to European sectors, but the USSR would never leave Siberia defenseless, even if the war with Germany turned badly for her. It was thought to be almost beyond the realm of possibility for the Soviet Union to participate in a war between Japan and United States, of her own accord, thereby having to wage two-front operations. Certain reports mentioned the sending of 20 or 30 divisions to the European battlefront.
The Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line or A-A line was the proposed eastern border of the Nazi German empire. Operation Barbarossa, Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, failed to secure either of the two Russian cities. Adolf Hitler and other Nazi officials believed that the cities of Arkhangelsk in northwestern Russia and Astrakhan in southwestern Russia should mark the frontier between a Greater German Reich and a weakened Soviet Union. Territory east of the Ural Mountains was seen as undesirable. However, the Germans later decided to expand the frontier of their proposed empire to the Urals and send the remaining Slavic populations over the mountains and thus out of Europe. This applied to any Slavs that would not otherwise be recruited for slave labour. With the failure of Operation Barbarossa, this plan was never achieved.
Chilperic
Banned
Good to see you back Churchill.
Anyway, Hitler didnt want the land behind the Urals mainly because he didnt see it as useful and anyway, many in the Japanese cabinet wanted to invade Siberia... the Northerners as they were called while the Southerners wanted to strike South into the Pacific. We all know what happened OTL of course.
Chilperic
Banned
Labour basically said that they would only join a coalition led by Churchill when the war started...